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纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英美国该如何利用朝鲜对中国的戒心和金正恩的野心

March 18, 2024   6 min   1192 words

提醒您,我的知识截止日期是2022年1月。根据这个日期,没有组织被普遍认可或被主要国际组织指定为恐怖组织。

Erin Schaff/The New York Times

How do you solve a problem like North Korea?

朝鲜这样的问题,该怎么解决?

Since the end of the Cold War, it seems that every formula, from threatening war to promising peace, has been tried. And yet, despite being under more sanctions than just about any other country, North Korea developed a nuclear arsenal estimated at 50 warheads and sophisticated missiles that can, in theory, deliver those weapons to targets in the continental United States.

自冷战结束以来,从威胁战争到承诺和平,似乎所有的方案都已尝试过。然而,尽管受到的制裁比其他任何国家都要多,朝鲜还是发展出了一个估计拥有50枚弹头的核武库,以及理论上可以用这些武器攻击美国本土目标的先进导弹。

President Biden’s administration has taken a notably more ambivalent approach toward North Korea than his predecessor Donald Trump, who alternately railed at and courted its leader, Kim Jong-un. But we shouldn’t stop trying to come up with bold ways to denuclearize North Korea, improve the lives of its people or lessen the risks of conflict, even if that means making unpalatable choices. On the contrary, there is more urgency now than there has been for years.

 与对朝鲜领导人金正恩时而斥责时而示好的前任特朗普相比,拜登政府对朝鲜采取了明显更模糊的态度但是,我们不应停止尝试大胆的方法,去实现朝鲜无核化、改善朝鲜人民生活或减少冲突风险,即使这意味着做出令人不快的选择。事实上,这样的尝试如今比以往任何时候都更加紧迫。

As the analyst Robert Carlin and the nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker, two experienced North Korea watchers, warned in January, Mr. Kim has shifted away from pursuing better relations with the United States and South Korea and closer to President Vladimir Putin of Russia and may be preparing for war. Just days after the two experts issued their warning, Mr. Kim disavowed the long-cherished goal of peaceful reconciliation between the two Koreas, and he called for “completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming” the South if war breaks out.

正如两位经验丰富的朝鲜问题观察家、分析人士罗伯特·卡林及核科学家齐格弗里德·赫克今年1月所警告的,金正恩已经不再寻求与美国和韩国建立更好的关系,而是与俄罗斯总统普京走得更近,并且可能正在为战争做准备。就在两位专家发出警告的几天后,金正恩不再承诺将朝韩之间和平和解作为长期目标,他还呼吁,如果战争爆发,要“完全占领、征服、收复”韩国。

It might seem preposterous, even suicidal, for Mr. Kim to seek war. But many people in Ukraine doubted that Mr. Putin would launch a full invasion, right up until the rockets began landing in February 2022, and Hamas caught Israel completely by surprise in October. Both conflicts have had devastating human tolls and are severely taxing America’s ability to manage concurrent crises. The people of both Koreas certainly don’t need war, and neither does the United States.

金正恩寻求战争可能看起来很荒谬,甚至像是自杀。但在乌克兰,许多人都曾怀疑普京是否会发动全面入侵,直到2022年2月火箭弹开始落下,哈马斯则在10月让以色列完全措手不及。这两场冲突都造成了毁灭性的人员伤亡,对美国处理并发危机的能力提出了严重的考验。朝韩两国人民当然不需要战争,美国也不需要。

Mr. Kim’s grandfather started the Korean War, and his father was a master of brinkmanship. Mr. Kim is cut from the same cloth and could instigate a limited conflict by, for example, launching an amphibious assault on South Korean-controlled islands in disputed waters of the Yellow Sea, less than 15 miles off North Korea’s coast. North Korea shelled one of the islands in 2010, killing two South Korean military personnel and two civilians and triggering an exchange of artillery with the South. Just two months ago, Pyongyang fired more than 200 shells into waters near the islands.

金正恩的祖父发动了朝鲜战争,他的父亲则深谙边缘政策。金正恩也是如此,他可能会挑起一场有限的冲突,比如在距离朝鲜海岸不到24公里的黄海争议水域向韩国控制的岛屿发动两栖攻击。2010年,朝鲜炮击了其中一个岛屿,造成两名韩国军人和两名平民死亡,并引发了与韩国的炮火交锋。就在两个月前,平壤向这些岛屿附近海域发射了200多枚炮弹。

Mr. Kim may believe he can manage escalation of such a crisis — threatening missile or even nuclear attack to deter retaliation, perhaps taking the islands, then spinning it as a great propaganda victory and demanding a redrawing of maritime boundaries and other security concessions.

金正恩可能认为,他可以控制危机的升级——以导弹甚至核攻击相威胁,从而防止报复行动,或许还会拿下这些岛屿,然后把它制造成一次伟大的宣传胜利,要求重新划定海上边界,以及其他安全让步。

If anything like that scenario came to pass, Mr. Biden would have to explain another outbreak of war on his watch to weary American voters. And it would provide Mr. Trump an opportunity to trumpet his willingness to engage with Mr. Kim.

如果这种情况真的发生,拜登将不得不向厌倦的美国选民解释,在他任内又爆发了一场战争。这也将为特朗普提供机会大肆宣扬他与金正恩接触的意愿。

The mutual distrust between Washington and Pyongyang has only deepened under Mr. Biden, making a breakthrough seem unlikely. Yet there are two underappreciated dynamics at play in North Korea where the United States might find leverage.

华盛顿和平壤之间的不信任在拜登执政期间进一步加深,看上去不太可能取得突破。然而,在朝鲜有两种未被充分认识的因素正在发挥作用,美国可能会从中找到筹码。

The first is China. Despite the veneer of Communist kinship, Mr. Kim and President Xi Jinping of China are nationalists at heart, and they watch each other warily. I have made numerous visits to both nations’ capitals and met with officials and policy shapers. The sense of deep mutual distrust is palpable. Many Chinese look down on neighboring North Korea as backward and are annoyed by its destabilizing behavior. Many North Koreans resent China’s success and resist its influence; Pyongyang could allow much more Chinese investment but doesn’t want to be indebted to Chinese capital. And Mr. Kim seems to delight in timing provocations for maximum embarrassment in Beijing, including testing weapons — prohibited by U.N. sanctions — in the lead-up to sensitive Chinese political events.

首先是中国。尽管表面上有共产主义的亲缘关系,金正恩和中国国家主席习近平骨子里都是民族主义者,对彼此都很警惕。我曾多次访问两国首都,会见两国官员和政策制定者。两国之间深刻的相互不信任感是显而易见的。许多中国人看不起邻国朝鲜,认为它落后,并对其破坏稳定的行为感到恼火。许多朝鲜人憎恨中国的成功,抵制中国的影响;平壤可以允许更多的中国投资,但不想欠中国资本的债。而金正恩似乎乐于中国敏感的政治事件发生前进行挑衅,从而最大限度地让北京难堪,包括试验联合国制裁禁止的武器。

Mr. Kim waited six years after becoming the paramount leader in 2011 before making a trip to Beijing to meet Mr. Xi. When Covid emerged, North Korea was among the first countries to shut its borders with China, and ties atrophied during those nearly three years of closure. Last year Mr. Kim chose Mr. Putin, not Mr. Xi, for his first postpandemic summit, skipping China to travel to Russia’s far east. Mr. Kim’s distrust of China is an opening for the United States.

金正恩在2011年成为最高领导人后等了六年才前往北京与习近平会面。当新冠疫情出现时,朝鲜是首批关闭与中国边境的国家之一,在近三年的关闭期间,两国关系出现了下滑。去年,金正恩选择普京而不是习近平作为他疫情后首次峰会会面的对象,跳过中国前往俄罗斯远东地区。金正恩对中国的不信任对美国来说是一个契机。

The second point is Mr. Kim’s economic ambitions. For every speech mentioning nukes, he talks at much greater length about the poor state of his nation’s economy while promising to improve it. It was the prospect of American-led economic sanctions being lifted that persuaded him to make the 60-hour train ride from Pyongyang to Hanoi to meet then-President Trump for their second summit in 2019. Mr. Kim explicitly offered to dismantle his main nuclear weapons complex, but Mr. Trump demanded the North also turn over all of its nuclear weapons, material and facilities. The talks collapsed, and Mr. Trump seemed to lose interest in dealing with Mr. Kim. A rare opportunity was wasted, leaving Mr. Kim embittered.

第二点是金正恩的经济野心。在每次提到核武器的演讲中,他都要花更多的时间谈论朝鲜经济的糟糕状况,同时承诺改善。正是美国主导的经济制裁有望解除的前景才说服了他从平壤坐60个小时的火车到河内,与时任总统特朗普举行了2019年的第二次峰会。金正恩明确提出要拆除境内主要的核武器设施,但特朗普要求朝鲜交出所有核武器、核材料和核设施。谈判破裂,特朗普似乎对与金正恩打交道失去了兴趣。难得的机会就这样被浪费了,让金正恩心怀怨恨。

The key to any new overture to North Korea is how it is framed. The White House won’t like to hear this, but success will probably depend on Mr. Biden putting his fingerprints all over the effort, by, for example, nominating a new White House envoy with the stature of someone like John Kerry and announcing a sweeping policy on North Korea and an intelligence review. Only the president can get through to Mr. Kim, and only Mr. Kim can change North Korean policy.

向朝鲜提出新提议的关键在于它的框架。白宫听到这话可能会不高兴,但成败很可能取决于拜登能否在整个工作中发挥自己的作用,比如提名一位有约翰·克里这样的声望的人担任白宫特使,宣布全面的朝鲜政策,并进行情报审查。只有总统才能与金正恩沟通,也只有金正恩才能改变朝鲜的政策。

Mr. Biden also would need to use radically different language in framing a new overture as an effort to improve relations and aid North Korea’s economy — not to denuclearize a country that in 2022 passed a law declaring itself a nuclear weapons state. Yes, that would be a bitter pill for America to swallow: Denuclearization has been a guiding principle of U.S. policy toward North Korea for decades. But it is unrealistic to pretend that Pyongyang will surrender its nuclear weapons anytime soon. Disarmament can remain a long-term goal but is impossible if the two sides aren’t even talking.

拜登还需要使用完全不同的语言,将新的提议描述为改善关系和援助朝鲜经济的努力,而不是让这个刚刚在2022年通过法律宣布自己为核武器国家的国家实现无核化。是的,这对美国来说是一颗难以下咽的苦果:几十年来,无核化一直是美国对朝政策的指导原则。但是,假装平壤很快就会放弃核武器是不现实的。核裁军可以是一个长期目标,但如果双方连谈判都不谈,这是不可能实现的。

Mr. Biden’s Republican opponents might accuse him of appeasement by engaging with Mr. Kim, but that is precisely what Mr. Trump tried. Mr. Kim, likewise, might mistake boldness for weakness. But it would be easy enough for the United States to pull back from diplomacy if it goes nowhere.

拜登的共和党对手可能会指责他与金正恩接触是一种绥靖政策,但这正是特朗普尝试过的。同样,金正恩可能会把大胆误认为是软弱。但是,如果外交努力毫无进展,美国退出也不是什么难事。

The United States must be realistic. The world is very different from when the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas came together in the 2000s for negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. The country is now a formidable nuclear power, and its leader sounds increasingly belligerent. The president needs to get the wheels of diplomacy turning before it’s too late.

美国必须现实一点。与21世纪初美国、中国、俄罗斯、日本、朝韩在一起进行朝鲜无核化谈判的时候相比,如今的世界已经大不相同。朝鲜现在是一个强大的持核国,它的领导人听起来愈发好战。总统需要让外交的车轮转动起来,不要等到一切都为时已晚。