纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英中国对台湾的越线行为必须被制止
February 27, 2024 5 min 1015 words
这篇报道指出了中国在台湾海峡的军事活动逐渐升级，呼吁采取更强硬的方式制止中国的越线行为。报道提到台湾及美国对此的回应显得缺乏明确的威慑力，使得北京得以逐步加强在台湾周围的军事存在，可能为未来夺岛提供了实质性的训练。 作为军事分析人员，我认为文章有力地强调了当前形势的危险性，特别是指出了对台湾军事防御的压力以及政策混乱的现象。报道还提到了台湾政府信息共享不透明的问题，这不仅使公众无法真实了解形势，也可能导致政策的混乱和不一致。 在我看来，这一问题需要得到更多国际关注，尤其是美国应该更加坚定地与台湾合作，共同采取措施遏制中国的挑衅行为。当前国际形势复杂，但忽视台湾问题可能使中国越线行为得逞。
In 2020, the balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait began a gradual but profound shift in China’s favor.
2020年，台湾海峡的军事力量平衡开始朝着有利于中国的方向逐步但却深刻地转变。
That August, Alex Azar, then the Health and Human Services secretary, became the highest-ranking U.S. cabinet official to visit Taiwan in more than four decades. Though he was there to talk about the pandemic, China’s People’s Liberation Army (P.L.A.) responded by carrying out large-scale military exercises around the self-governing island, sending aircraft over the median line of the Taiwan Strait for only the third time in more than 20 years. Since then, China has responded to such visits and other perceived provocations by flying more than 4,800 sorties, with growing numbers of aircraft flying in locations previously seen as off-limits and conducting dozens of increasingly complex air and naval military exercises around Taiwan.
那年8月，时任美国卫生与公众服务部部长亚历克斯·阿扎尔成为40多年来访问台湾的最高级别美国内阁官员。尽管他是去讨论疫情的，但中国人民解放军却以在这个自治岛屿周围进行大规模军事演习作为回应，派遣飞机飞越台湾海峡中线，20多年来，这种情况仅发生了三次。自那以后，作为对这种访问和其他被视为挑衅的行为的回应，中国出动了4800多架次飞机，越来越多的飞机在以前被视为禁区的地方飞行，并在台湾周围进行了数十次日益复杂的海空军事演习。
The P.L.A.’s now-normalized presence around Taiwan raises the risk of an accidental confrontation. But over the longer term, it has also gradually created a dangerous sense of complacency in Taipei and Washington, while giving China the crucial operational practice it might one day need to seize the island.
中国人民解放军在台湾周围常态化的存在增加了发生意外对抗的风险。但从长期来看，这还渐渐让台北和美国进入一种逆来顺受的状态，同时让中国可以展开未来夺岛作战所需的关键训练。
As a military analyst specializing in China and Taiwan who has spent the last two years managing an open-source database tracking Chinese military activity, I am deeply concerned about the dangers that this activity poses. Alarm bells should be ringing, but neither Taiwan nor the United States have taken meaningful action to deter China, and Taiwan’s response has been inconsistent and lacks transparency, which may further embolden Beijing. A more robust approach is needed to deter China from escalating the situation.
作为一名专门研究中国大陆和台湾的军事分析人员，我在过去两年时间里管理着一个追踪中国军事活动的开源数据库，我对这些活动带来的危险深感担忧。警钟应该一直在响，但台湾和美国都没有采取有意义的行动来威慑中国，台湾的反应一直前后不一，缺乏透明度，这可能会进一步鼓励北京。需要采取更强硬的方式来阻止中国令局势升级。
In 2020, shortly after China began raising the pressure, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense started releasing daily reports on Chinese military activity inside the island’s Air Defense Identification Zone, a perimeter extending beyond Taiwan’s territorial waters and airspace that is monitored to provide early warning of approaching Chinese planes or missiles. In previous years, China rarely entered the zone. But in 2020, P.L.A. aircraft breached it nearly 400 times. Last year, that number exceeded 1,700.
Beijing has steadily pushed the envelope. P.L.A. forces also rarely crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, the halfway point between China and Taiwan. But in August 2022, after a visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, then the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Chinese forces crossed the line 302 times that month, essentially erasing it as a functional boundary. Today, Chinese aircraft continue to cross the line almost daily, leaving Taiwan only minutes to assess China’s intentions in a dangerous guessing game that leaves the door open for miscalculation. Since last year, China also has essentially established a permanent naval presence around the island.
With no official contact between Beijing and Taipei for the past eight years, the chances of defusing an inadvertent clash are limited. An isolated confrontation could escalate into an attack by China or to a rapid deployment of the now well-drilled air and naval forces it has around Taiwan, cutting the island off from any U.S. help and dramatically reducing American military options.
由于过去八年，北京和台北之间没有任何官方接触，化解一场意外冲突的可能性非常有限。一场孤立的对抗事件可能升级为中国的攻击，或者导致中国在台湾周围迅速部署现在已经训练有素的空军和海军部队，切断美国对台湾的任何帮助，并大大减少美国的军事选项。
This tense climate is straining Taiwan’s defenses. In early 2021, Taiwan stopped scrambling jets for every violation of the island’s Air Defense Identification Zone after spending almost nine percent of the previous year’s defense budget on monitoring Chinese aircraft.
This atmosphere also has sown policy confusion. In October 2022, after the incursions following Ms. Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan’s defense ministry announced that any P.L.A. aircraft that violate Taiwan’s territorial air and sea space — 12 nautical miles from the island’s shores — will be viewed as a “first strike,” likely meaning they would be shot down.
这种氛围也造成了政策上的混乱。2022年10月，在佩洛西访问台湾之后，台湾国防部宣布，任何解放军飞机如侵犯台湾领空和领海——距离台湾海岸12海里范围内——都将被视为“第一击”，这可能意味着它们将被击落。
Since then, no incursions by P.L.A. aircraft have been publicly revealed, but China has tested Taiwan’s policy by sending at least 27 balloons into the island’s territorial airspace since the start of this year, forcing Taipei to choose between taking no action, which gives Beijing tacit permission to continue to violate the island’s airspace, or shooting down the balloons, which could provoke China. So far, Taiwan is not known to have taken any action against the balloons that have entered its airspace.
从那以后，解放军飞机的侵犯行为没有被公开披露，但自今年年初以来，中国向台湾领土领空发送了至少27个气球，以此试探台湾的政策，迫使台北在不采取行动或击落气球之间选择——前者等于默许北京继续侵犯台湾领空，后者可能会激怒中国。到目前为止，台湾尚未对进入其领空的气球采取任何行动。
Taipei’s approach to sharing information about Chinese activities with the public has not been fully transparent, marked by unexplained changes in how much information it releases. Caution is understandable to avoid raising public alarm. But a lack of transparency also prevents the government from communicating the true situation to Taiwan’s people, which could lead to calls for a different policy.
Taiwanese made their desires clear last month when they chose Lai Ching-te, who is committed to the island’s sovereignty, as their next president. Mr. Lai’s victory presents a chance for his government to adopt a more transparent approach to Beijing’s military aggression similar to that of the Philippines, which has demonstrated that drawing attention to Chinese actions in the South China Sea can help build domestic, regional and international support for efforts to counter that aggression.
上个月，台湾人民通过选择致力于台湾主权的赖清德担任下一任总统，明确表达了他们的愿望。赖清德的胜选为政府提供了一个机会，使其对北京的军事侵略能够采取一种更透明的、类似于菲律宾的做法。菲律宾已经证明，引起对中国在南海行动的关注有助于在国内、地区和国际范围内为对抗这种侵略赢得支持。
In Washington, there is bipartisan support for Taiwan, and President Biden has repeatedly stated that the United States would come to the island’s defense. The Taiwan Relations Act, which has governed American policy toward the island for four decades, explicitly states that any moves to determine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means would be of “grave concern.” But America has come up with no specific response to China’s recent military activity.
在华盛顿，两党都支持台湾，拜登总统多次表示，美国将保卫台湾。40年来，美国对台政策一直遵循《台湾关系法》，该法明确规定，任何以非和平方式决定台湾未来的举动都将受到“严重关切”。但是美国没有对中国最近的军事活动做出具体回应。
The United States must make clear to China that its military activities could spark a war and are no longer acceptable. Washington should also coordinate with Taipei on more effective ways to deter Chinese provocations, such as through increased information sharing, air patrol exercises and ensuring that the island is fully equipped and prepared to defend its sovereignty.
美国必须向中国表明，其军事活动可能引发战争，这是不可接受的。华盛顿还应与台北协调，以更有效的方式遏制中国的挑衅，例如加强信息共享、空中巡逻演习，并确保台湾拥有充分的装备和准备来捍卫其主权。
America’s strategic attention is being consumed by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. But if the United States takes its eye off the perilous situation facing Taiwan, there soon may be no lines left for China to cross.
美国的战略注意力正被乌克兰和中东的战争所消耗。但是，如果美国把目光从台湾面临的危险局势上移开，中国可能很快就会越过所有的线了。