纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英中国供应商和摩洛哥港口俄罗斯如何绕过全球科技制裁
December 20, 2023 8 min 1622 words
这篇报道揭示了俄罗斯如何巧妙绕过全球科技制裁，通过中文供应商和摩洛哥港口等手段获取所需技术。文章指出，尽管西方国家实施了贸易限制，俄罗斯通过中国供应商、中间商网络和港口转运等途径成功获取了包括通信设备、监控器材、微芯片和武器系统在内的商业硬件。报道中提到的俄罗斯的柔性应对和技术获取成功，引发对西方贸易制裁效果的质疑。文章着重强调，即便技术巨头可能需要更好地控制产品去向，但要阻止商业技术的全球流动非常困难。整体而言，这篇报道为读者提供了深入了解俄罗斯绕过科技制裁的情况，同时也提出了对西方贸易政策的反思。
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, engineers at Convex, a Russian telecommunications company, needed to find American equipment to transmit data to the country’s feared intelligence service. But no gear was flowing in after Western nations imposed sweeping new trade limits on Russia.
Convex’s employees soon found a solution.
Convex的员工很快找到了解决方案。
While Cisco, a U.S. tech provider, had halted sales to Russia on March 3, 2022, Convex’s engineers easily obtained the Cisco gear they needed through an obscure Russian e-commerce site called Nag, which had gotten around international trade restrictions by buying the American equipment through a web of suppliers in China.
虽然美国技术供应商思科已在2022年3月3日停止了向俄罗斯销售设备，但Convex的工程师通过一个鲜为人知的俄罗斯电子商务网站Nag，轻松地获得了他们所需的思科设备，该网站通过一个中国供应商网络绕过国际贸易限制，购买美国产品。
Convex engineers then visited the offices of Russia’s Federal Security Service, known as the F.S.B., in Yekaterinburg to install the gear that would help categorize and send data to the authorities. “Coordinate with the F.S.B. the placement of the Cisco Catalyst WS-C4948E switch,” a Convex engineer wrote on March 23, 2022, according to a company communications log obtained by The New York Times.
随后，Convex的工程师前往俄罗斯联邦安全局（简称FSB）位于叶卡捷琳堡的办公室安装设备，这些设备将帮助数据分类和向当局传输。据《纽约时报》获得的公司内部通讯的日志，一名Convex工程师在2022年3月23日写道：“与FSB协调安装思科Catalyst WS-C4948E交换机事宜。”
In the 22 months since the war in Ukraine began, Russia has largely continued getting the technology it needs to keep its economy running. After export restrictions and corporate bans initially led to trade disruptions, Russian suppliers found loopholes and cultivated workarounds. Almost no piece of commercial hardware — including basic telecom equipment, surveillance gear, microchips for advanced computing and weapons systems, and drones — has been too hard to get.
Russian authorities and companies have united to take advantage of cracks in the global response. They have tapped webs of intermediaries, including middlemen in China, and disguised their activity through shell companies, according to leaked Russian government emails, trade documents and records of online conversations between Russian engineers obtained by The Times.
俄罗斯当局和企业联合起来，利用全球对俄乌战争的应对中存在的裂痕。据时报获得的泄露出来的俄罗斯政府电子邮件、贸易文件和俄罗斯工程师们的网聊记录，他们利用包括中国中间商在内的一个中间商网络，通过空壳公司掩蔽他们的活动。
They have also turned to countries that have staked out neutral positions in the conflict, such as Morocco and Turkey, and used their ports to receive goods from global tech manufacturing centers that are then placed on other ships headed toward Russia, a process known as transshipment. The prohibited tech products were then made available to buy from well-known suppliers and on easy-to-use e-commerce sites like Nag.
他们还转向对俄乌战争采取中立立场的国家，例如摩洛哥和土耳其，利用这些国家的港口接收来自全球各地的科技制造中心的货物，然后将货物装上其他前往俄罗斯的船只，这个过程名为转运。然后，这些被禁运的科技产品就可从知名的供应商和Nag等易于使用的电子商务网站上购得。
Flexibility has been paramount. In weekly emails, Russian trade officials shared tips on which ports would transfer goods, who would trade in rubles and where Russian-flagged ships could be repaired, the documents show. If one supplier stopped selling, they found another. If a shipping route was cut off, new ones took up the slack.
灵活性至关重要。文件显示，俄罗斯的贸易官员们在每周的电子邮件往来中分享哪些港口能转运货物、哪些商人能用卢布交易，以及悬挂俄罗斯国旗的船只能在哪里修理等窍门。如果一家供应商停止了销售，他们会找到另一家供应商。如果一条航运路线被切断，新的航运路线会取而代之。
The documents offer a rare glimpse of a race in which Russian traders have reliably stayed one step ahead of U.S.-led efforts to cut them off. Their success shows how difficult it is to stop the global movement of commercial technology, raising questions about the effectiveness of Western trade restrictions and whether tech giants should better control the destinations of their products — and if it is even possible to do so.
这些文件提供了难得的机会，让人得以一窥俄罗斯的贸易商在这场竞争中始终领先于美国领导的切断他们的努力。他们的成功表明，阻止商业性技术在全球流动有多么困难，引发了人们对西方贸易制裁是否有效的怀疑，以及科技巨头们是否应该更好地控制它们产品的目的地——以及是否有可能做到这点的问题。
Cisco declined to comment. Convex did not respond to requests for comment.
思科拒绝对本文置评。Convex没有回复记者的置评请求。
A Beautiful Friendship
美好的友谊
As sanctions against Russia took effect last year, ProSoft, a Moscow-based electronics provider, experienced the fallout.
随着对俄制裁于去年生效，总部设在莫斯科的电子产品供应商ProSoft受到了影响。
Officials at the company, which sells biometric surveillance equipment and tech for heavy industry and critical infrastructure, emailed the Russian government trade mission in Morocco for help, according to a message reviewed by The Times.
这是一家面向重工业和关键基础设施销售生物特征识别监控设备和技术的公司。根据时报掌握的信息，该公司高层给俄罗斯政府驻摩洛哥的贸易代表团发去了寻求帮助的电子邮件。
“Just a week ago, it was not difficult to ship them to us from American and European suppliers,” a ProSoft executive wrote, referring to now-banned tech. Now “we run the risk of starting to reduce production (there are small reserves in the warehouse).”
“就在一周前，从美国和欧洲供应商将它们运送给我们还没有困难，”ProSoft的一名高管在信中写道，他指的是当时已被禁止的技术。现在“我们面临着开始减产的风险（仓库里还有少量储备）”。
A spreadsheet attached to the message listed hundreds of American, European and Japanese microchips and sensors that ProSoft needed.
电子邮件附带的表格列出了ProSoft需要的美国、欧洲和日本生产的数百种微芯片和传感器。
At the time, Russia’s economy was absorbing the initial effects of trade restrictions. The ruble tumbled, inflation and interest rates soared, Russian banks were cut off from large swaths of the global financial system and oligarchs sat helpless as their yachts were seized.
俄罗斯的经济当时正在消化贸易限制的最初影响。卢布暴跌，通货膨胀率和利率飙升，俄罗斯的银行与大部分全球金融体系的联系被切断，寡头们对自己的游艇被扣押束手无策。
But the pain did not last as President Vladimir V. Putin remade Russia’s economy. Russian officials and executives swiftly teamed up to find workarounds. Political loyalists profited as Western companies fled.
但随着总统普京重振俄罗斯经济，这种痛苦并没有持续下去。俄罗斯的官员们和企业高管迅速联手寻找变通方法。西方公司的逃离让政治忠诚者获利。
In Morocco, Russia’s trade office, which looks after the country’s economic interests overseas, also helped Russian companies regain their footing. After ProSoft reached out for help, trade officials jumped into action.
在摩洛哥，负责俄罗斯海外经济利益的俄罗斯贸易代表团也在帮助俄企重新站稳脚跟。收到ProSoft的求助信后，贸易官员们立即行动起来。
“We’re in constant contact with the general director” of Morocco’s state-run port of Tanger Med, one Russian official wrote in an April 2022 email. “In the event of ships entering under the Russian flag, there will be no problems with maintenance.”
“我们与摩洛哥国营的丹吉尔地中海港的总经理一直保持着联系，”一名俄罗斯官员在2022年4月的一封电子邮件中写道。“若有悬挂俄罗斯国旗的船只进港的话，维修上不会遇到问题。”
A spokeswoman for Tanger Med, which hugs the Strait of Gibraltar, said the port leased space to shipping companies and had “no information nor responsibility” about vessels moving through the complex. The port, which handles more than eight million containers annually connecting to 180 international ports, was “not aware” of shipped goods calling at Russian ports before or after being at Tanger Med, or maintenance of Russian ships being performed, she added.
丹吉尔地中海港位于直布罗陀海峡，港口的一名发言人说，该港向航运公司租赁空间，“既不了解、也不负责”进出港口的船只。丹吉尔地中海港每年装卸逾800万个集装箱，停靠的船只去往或来自全球180个港口，该发言人补充说，“不知道”进出港口的船只在进港前或出港后是否停靠俄罗斯的港口，也不知道俄罗斯船只是否在丹吉尔地中海港进行维修。
By November 2022, Russian trade officials in Morocco were bragging that their “direct support” had turned the African country into an electronics transshipment hub. Goods from Taiwan, China and other manufacturing centers were offloaded at Tanger Med and then placed on other ships headed to Russia.
到2022年11月时，俄罗斯驻摩洛哥贸易官员们吹嘘说，他们的“直接支持”已将这个非洲国家变成了一个电子产品转运中心。来自台湾、中国和其他制造中心的货物在这里卸货后，再装上其他前往俄罗斯的船只。
An analysis of ProSoft’s offerings found nearly 300 products for sale that contain Intel chips, as well as components made by Nvidia and an A.I. optimized computer chip designed by Google. Although it is unclear how the imports were ultimately used, American chips have been found on Russian missiles and drones, according to weapons experts.
对ProSoft产品的分析发现，其出售的近300种产品里包含英特尔芯片、英伟达制造的部件，以及谷歌设计的用人工智能优化的计算机芯片。虽然尚不清楚俄罗斯进口这些东西的最终用途，但武器专家说，已在俄罗斯的导弹和无人机上找到了美国的芯片。
Nvidia, Intel and Google declined to comment. Texas Instruments said it opposed “the illicit diversion of our products to Russia.” ProSoft, NXP and Russia’s trade representative to Morocco did not respond to requests for comment.
英伟达、英特尔和谷歌均拒绝置评。得州仪器表示，它反对“将我们的产品非法转移到俄罗斯”。ProSoft、恩智浦，以及俄罗斯驻摩洛哥贸易代表均未回复记者的置评请求。
In October 2022, Russian trade officials said they had established 20 operators at the Tanger-Med port to “promptly carry out” the logistics of getting cargo loaded onto “feeder” vessels ultimately bound for Russia, according to a weekly shipping report. Another report noted that ports in Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had accepted payment in rubles.
据一份每周航运报告，2022年10月，俄罗斯贸易官员说，他们已在丹吉尔地中海港设立了20个操作员，以“迅速开展”将货物装载到最终开往俄罗斯的“支线”船上的物流工作。另一份报告提到土耳其的港口已接受了卢布付款，土耳其是北大西洋公约组织成员国。
“The sanctions restrictions have been successfully overcome,” one government report said of a Turkish trade route this March.
俄罗斯政府在一份今年3月的报告中提到土耳其的贸易路线时写道：“制裁限制已被成功克服。”
Click and Buy
点击购买
On little-known Russian e-commerce sites like Nag, OCS Distribution, 3Logic Distribution and 4Telecom, complex technologies made by major American and European telecom manufacturers, such as Cisco, HP, Juniper, Ericsson and Nokia, are listed for sale.
思科、惠普、瞻博、爱立信和诺基亚等美国和欧洲主要电信设备制造商的高级科技产品，在Nag、OCS Distribution、3Logic Distribution、4Telecom等鲜为人知的俄罗斯电子商务网站上都能买到。
Many of these sites freely sold Western technology for decades, but overhauled their supply chains because of the war. Since then, the platforms have received hundreds of millions of dollars in technology from China, according to trade records.
其中许多网站不受限制地销售西方技术已有几十年了，但由于俄乌战争，它们彻底改变了自己的供应链。据贸易记录，自战争爆发以来，这些平台已从中国获得了数亿美元的技术。
China and Hong Kong supplied 85 percent of semiconductors imported to Russia from March 2022 to September 2023, up from 27 percent before the conflict, according to the Silverado Policy Accelerator, a nonprofit that studies Russian trade routes.
研究俄罗斯贸易路线的非营利组织Silverado Policy Accelerator的数据显示，中国和香港提供了俄罗斯在2022年3月到2023年9月间进口半导体的85%，高于俄乌冲突发生前的 27%。
Nag, which sells hardware to regional telecoms and surveillance contractors, is one major platform. Through intermediaries, it has bought roughly $100 million in restricted American tech since the war began, according to trade data. In total, it imported $150 million in hardware from China this year, the data show. Communications gear, which has ostensibly been prohibited from reaching Russia, is readily available on its site, filtered by price, product type and quantity.
向区域电信公司和监控承包商销售硬件的Nag是一个主要的平台。据贸易数据，自俄乌战争开始以来，Nag已通过中间商购买了大约1亿美元受限制的美国技术。数据显示，该公司今年已从中国进口了总计1.5亿美元的硬件。在Nag网站上，很容易找到貌似已经禁止进入俄罗斯的通信设备，可按价格、产品类型和数量进行筛选。
Nag employees have talked about logistical challenges that international sanctions have caused, according to internal communications. In May 2022, a Nag employee wrote to a Russian customer that “the old transit system has ended,” delaying delivery of $20,000 of Juniper equipment. A month later, Nag followed up to say that the problem had been resolved and that the gear would arrive in the coming months.
据公司的内部通讯，Nag员工谈论过国际制裁造成的物流挑战。 2022年5月，一名Nag员在写给一个俄罗斯客户的信中称，“旧的运输系统已不再工作”，导致价值2万美元的瞻博网络设备的交付被推迟。一个月后，Nag员工发的跟进信息表示问题已经解决，设备将在未来几个月内送达。
Tech for building online surveillance and censorship was also available. Russian telecom operators are required by law to provide communications data about customers to the security services, meaning they must buy specialized equipment that sends the information to government agents. On Nag message boards, now accessible only from within Russia, engineers posted technical tips for making the systems work to F.S.B. specs.
用于建立在线监控和审查的技术也可以获得。俄罗斯法律要求国内的电信运营商们向安全部门提供有关客户的通信数据，这意味着他们必须购买专门设备把信息发送给政府情报人员。在Nag的留言板上，有工程师们发布的让系统符合FSB规格的技术提示，该留言板现在只能从俄罗斯境内访问。
Ericsson, Juniper, Nokia and IBM said any imports into Russia were done without their consent. OCS Distribution said that it “does not sell products in violation of international sanctions and restrictions” and that any such tech listed on its website for purchase was there because it was in the midst of an overhaul. HP, 3Logic Distribution and 4Telecom did not respond to requests for comment.
爱立信、瞻博、诺基亚和IBM表示，任何出口到俄罗斯的东西都没有经它们的同意。OCS Distribution说，它“不销售违反国际制裁和限制的产品”，其网站上有此类可供购买的技术是因为网站目前处于彻底检修状态。惠普、3Logic Distribution、4Telecom没有回复记者的置评请求。
A network of Nag-operated companies and brands in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates has also helped obscure shipments of sanctioned technology. In total, Nag brought in almost $10 million in Cisco equipment and about $1 million in Nokia and Intel products to Russia over the past year.
哈萨克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦和阿拉伯联合酋长国的一个Nag运营的公司和品牌网络也帮助掩盖了受制裁技术运往俄罗斯的情况。去年，Nag进口的思科设备共计近1000万美元，还有约100万美元的诺基亚和英特尔产品。
At the F.S.B. offices in Yekaterinburg, the Cisco gear that Convex engineers installed sat alongside routers made by Juniper, according to Convex’s records. Less than a year later, the availability of Western tech was so abundant that Convex’s engineers could shop around.
据Convex的记录，其工程师在叶卡捷琳堡的FSB办公室安装的思科设备，放在瞻博网络制造的路由器旁边。在实行制裁不到一年后，俄罗斯仍能买到如此之多的西方技术，以至于 Convex的工程师可以货比三家。
In a conversation on Convex’s internal messaging system this year, engineers focused on a new supplier that they had “spotted.” Operating under the name sale-server.ru, the supplier had plenty of restricted name-brand technology from HP, IBM and others. More important, the price was right.
在Convex内部短信系统今年的一次交谈中，工程师们讨论的重点是他们“发现”了一家新供应商。该供应商的网址是sale-server.ru，其平台上有大量禁运产品，包括来自惠普、IBM和其他公司的名牌技术。更重要的是价格合适。
“Cheaper than Nag,” one Convex employee wrote.
“比Nag便宜，”一名Convex员工写道。