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纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英向清洁能源转型美国有抗衡中国的底气吗

November 7, 2023   5 min   1050 words

这篇报道深刻地探讨了全球清洁能源转型中中国在关键矿产供应链上的主导地位,以及美国在应对这一挑战上的举措。中国在关键矿产如石墨、锂化合物等方面的垄断地位对清洁能源制造业构成了潜在威胁。文章强调了中国在清洁能源产业中的策略性投资,尤其是在国内和海外矿山和精炼厂的投资,这使中国能够为其高级制造业提供所需的高级材料。 文章提到美国通过《通胀削减法案》采取了一些措施,试图减少对中国主导供应链的依赖,但也指出该法案未能有效刺激采矿和矿物加工方面的投资。虽然美国已经吸引了数十亿美元的清洁能源制造业投资,但关键矿产的生产仍然依赖中国。 作者指出,解决供应链问题需要在国内外采取措施,包括简化国内矿山和矿物加工设施的投资流程,以及支持多元化全球供应链的投资。此外,作者还提到了回收再利用无法解决供应问题,因为需求迅速增长,而可供回收的关键矿产数量有限。 最后,文章呼吁清洁能源转型不仅需要淘汰化石燃料,还需要引入新的采矿业,以确保供应链的多样性和国家安全,同时也要更加公正和可持续。文章强调了美国及其自由贸易伙伴面临的重大挑战,即如何扩大关键矿产的生产,实现供应链多元化。这篇报道为清洁能源转型的地缘政治问题提供了深刻的洞察和思考。

Miriam Doerr and Martin Frommherz/Shutterstock

China recently rattled the world’s electric vehicle supply chains by announcing new export controls on graphite, a key component of lithium-ion batteries. If China uses the export controls, which take effect on Dec. 1, to reduce exports of graphite or to favor Chinese-owned companies operating abroad, it could slow down efforts to scale up advanced battery manufacturing globally.

不久前,中国宣布对生产锂离子电池的关键原料——石墨实施新的出口管制,令全球电动汽车供应链深感不安。如果中国利用将于12月1日生效的出口管制措施来减少石墨出口,或者为在海外经营的中资企业提供支持的话,可能会减缓在全球范围内扩大先进电池制造规模的努力。

Welcome to the geopolitics of the clean energy transition. Unlike in the 20th century, when China was largely a bystander in petroleum politics, the country has achieved new geopolitical significance by scaling up investments in clean energy manufacturing and the critical minerals that work requires.

欢迎来到清洁能源转型的地缘政治世界。与20世纪不同,当时中国在石油政治中基本上属于一个旁观者。如今,它通过加大对清洁能源制造及其生产所需的关键矿产的投资,获得了新的地缘政治优势。

The supply chains for many critical minerals, not just graphite, run through China. In the case of materials critical to the production of lithium-ion batteries, which power electric vehicles, the consulting group Benchmark Mineral Intelligence estimated that China controlled 58 percent of the global production of lithium compounds in 2022, 69 percent of nickel sulfate, 69 percent of synthetic graphite, 75 percent of cobalt, 95 percent of manganese and 100 percent of spherical graphite. China plays a similarly outsize role in the supply of materials used in solar panels and wind turbines.

不仅是石墨,许多关键矿产的供应链都绕不开中国。据咨询机构基准矿业情报公司估计,就为电动车提供动力的锂离子电池需要的关键材料而言,2022年中国控制了全球58%的锂化合物产量、69%的硫酸镍、69%的合成石墨、75%的钴、95%的锰,以及100%的球形石墨。在太阳能电池板和风力涡轮机所用材料的供应方面,中国也扮演着同样重要的角色。

But this isn’t simply a story about China’s geological good fortune. The country’s reserves of most of these minerals aren’t actually that large. Instead, it is a story of strategy. Over the past decade, China has systematically invested in overseas and domestic mines that feed into Chinese-owned refineries, where raw materials from around the world are processed into the high-grade materials needed for advanced manufacturing.

但这不仅仅是一个关于中国有幸拥有丰富地质资源的故事。就这些矿产中的大部分来说,中国的储量实际上并没有那么大。在过去10年间,中国系统地投资了国内外的矿山,为中国拥有的精炼厂提供原料,来自世界各地的原材料在这些工厂里被加工成先进制造业所需的高级材料。

China justified the new export controls on graphite as a national security measure. But most observers read China’s move as a warning shot in an increasingly high-stakes trade skirmish, as China, the United States and the European Union explore the new geopolitics of advanced manufacturing and a clean-energy transition. Three days before China announced the export controls on graphite, the Biden administration restricted exports of computer chips used in artificial intelligence applications to China.

中国称,新的石墨出口管制是国家安全措施。但大多数观察人士认为,在中国、美国和欧盟探索先进制造业和清洁能源转型的新地缘政治之际,此举是对风险日益增高的贸易冲突发出的警告。在中国宣布石墨出口管制的三天前,拜登政府限制向中国出口用于人工智能应用的计算机芯片。

China’s leverage over the global critical minerals supply explains why the particulars of the Inflation Reduction Act are so important. The law, passed in August 2022, is not just the most consequential piece of climate and energy legislation in U.S. history; it is also designed to drive investment in domestic manufacturing and in supply chains that do an end run around China. It does this, in part, by providing generous incentives for domestic production of critical minerals, battery components and batteries.

中国对全球关键矿产供应的影响力解释了《通胀削减法案》的条文为何如此重要。这项于2022年8月通过的法律不仅是美国历史上最重要的气候和能源立法,还旨在推动对国内制造业以及绕过中国的供应链的投资。这在一定程度上是通过为关键矿产品、电池组件和电池的国内生产提供慷慨的激励措施来实现的。

Consider its $7,500 tax credit toward electric vehicle purchases. For a vehicle to be eligible for the subsidy, in addition to meeting price caps, final assembly must take place in North America, and an increasing percentage of the critical minerals and battery components must be sourced from North America or, in the case of critical minerals, from free-trade partners. China does not have a free-trade agreement with the United States. The Treasury Department may also further limit the use of materials or components from China, depending on how it enforces the act’s restrictions on sourcing materials from a “foreign entity of concern.”

以购买电动车的7500美元税收抵免为例。一辆车要想获得补贴,除了要满足价格上限,最后的组装工作还必须在北美完成,而且比例越来越大的关键矿产和电池组件必须来自北美,或者就关键矿产而言,必须来自自由贸易伙伴。中国与美国没有签署自由贸易协定。财政部还可能进一步限制使用来自中国的材料或组件,这取决于它如何执行该法案中关于从“受关注的外国实体”采购原材料的限制规定。

In some respects, this law is working. Based on tracking I’ve undertaken with my students at Wellesley College, companies have announced $65.5 billion in investments since the act became law, including 15 new large-scale factories to produce batteries. If these projects all come online as planned, the United States will have enough battery manufacturing capacity to supply 14 million electric vehicles per year.

在某些方面,这项法律正在发挥作用。根据我在韦尔斯利学院与学生进行的跟踪调查发现,自该法案成为法律以来,企业已宣布655亿美元投资,其中包括15家新的大型电池生产企业。如果这些项目能够按计划投产的话,美国的电池生产能力将足以每年供应1400万辆电动汽车。

What the Inflation Reduction Act hasn’t done, however, is spur similar investments in mining and minerals processing. Although it includes a 10 percent tax credit for critical minerals production (a category that includes graphite), about 2 percent of the newly announced investments are going toward mining and materials processing facilities. So as the United States expands investments in clean energy manufacturing, its dependency on global supply chains, dominated by China, will only grow.

然而,《通胀削减法案》并没有在采矿和矿物加工领域刺激类似的投资。虽然它包括对关键矿物生产(包括石墨所在的类别)10%的税收抵免,但新宣布的投资中约有2%用于采矿和材料加工设施。因此,随着美国扩大对清洁能源制造业的投资,它对中国主导的全球供应链的依赖只会增加。

Building more diverse and resilient supply chains for critical minerals requires action at home and abroad. First, the United States needs to reduce the hurdles to investing in domestic mines and mineral processing facilities. While a new battery or E.V. factory can be brought online in a few years, identifying, permitting and commissioning mines and refineries often stretches out over a decade or more. Reforming permitting processes to ensure better engagement with local communities and expedited environmental reviews is urgently needed. Such reforms could help advance projects like Graphite One, a mine planned for Alaska’s Seward Peninsula.

为关键矿产建立更为多样化、更具弹性的供应链,需要在国内外采取行动。首先,美国需要减少投资国内矿山和矿物加工设施的障碍。虽然新的电池或电动车企业可以在几年内投产,但矿山和精炼厂的确定、许可和投产,往往需要10年或更长的时间。迫切需要改革审批流程,以确保更好地与当地社区合作,并加快环境审查。这种改革有助于推进像“石墨一号”这样的项目,该项目计划在阿拉斯加苏厄德半岛投产。

Second, the United States needs to support investments that diversify global supply chains. The Biden administration has begun laying the groundwork for such investments. In June 2022, it announced the Minerals Security Partnership, which includes promises of loan guarantees and debt financing and emphasizes the need for projects to benefit local communities and expand supplies of critical minerals from overseas. One potential project is a mine in Mozambique, which could supply graphite to the United States.

其次,美国需要支持利于全球供应链多元化的投资。拜登政府已经开始为这类投资打基础。2022年6月,政府宣布了“矿产安全伙伴关系”,其中包括贷款担保和债务融资的承诺,并强调项目必须造福当地社区,以及扩大来自海外的关键矿产供应。一个潜在的项目是莫桑比克的一座矿山,该矿山可以向美国供应石墨。

What isn’t going to solve the supply problem, at least in the coming decades, is recycling. Given the global goals for scaling up clean-energy deployment, nowhere near enough of these critical minerals are available for recycling to meet the rapidly growing demand. The International Energy Agency forecasts that if the world is going to meet its most ambitious clean-energy goals by midcentury, production of critical minerals will need to increase to six times 2020 levels by 2040; graphite production will need to increase up to 25 times 2020 levels.

至少在未来几十年内,回收再利用是无法解决供应问题的。考虑到扩大清洁能源部署的全球目标,可供回收利用的这些关键矿产远远不足以满足快速增长的需求。国际能源机构预测,如果世界要在本世纪中叶实现最雄心勃勃的清洁能源目标,到2040年,关键矿产的产量需要增加到2020年的6倍;石墨产量需要达到2020年的25倍。

Climate action can no longer be about phasing out fossil fuels alone. It must also be about phasing in a new set of extractive industries needed to enable a clean-energy transition. China figured this out a decade ago. The United States and its free-trade partners now face a monumental challenge: scaling up production of critical minerals, diversifying supply chains to protect national security and doing so in ways that are both more just and more sustainable.

气候行动不能再仅仅是分阶段淘汰化石燃料。它还必须逐步引入一系列新的采掘业,以实现清洁能源转型。中国在十年前就明白了这一点。美国及其自由贸易伙伴现在面临着一个巨大的挑战:扩大关键矿产的生产,使供应链多元化以保护国家安全,并以更公正、更可持续的方式做到这一点。

The place to begin is by reckoning with what it is going to take to build a clean-energy future, from the ground up.

我们首先要考虑的是,如何从头开始建设一个清洁能源的未来。