The Guardian-Maldives election run-off pitched as fork in the road between India and China
September 29, 2023 6 min 1103 words
这篇报道凸显了马尔代夫总统选举的重要性，将其视为印度和中国之间的地缘政治较量的焦点。自过去十年以来，印度和中国一直在争夺对马尔代夫的影响力，而这次选举将其夸大成一场较量。反对派候选人穆罕默德·穆伊兹试图推翻现任总统穆罕默德·索里赫政府，将其视为允许印度对马尔代夫施加过多影响的元凶。自2018年索里赫意外当选总统以来，他使马尔代夫更加亲近印度，而与前政权下的中国投资保持距离。 穆伊兹指责索里赫过于接近印度，声称现政府允许印度在马尔代夫领土上存在和影响，而索里赫对此进行了否认。由于在九月初的首轮选举中，两位候选人都未能获得超过50%的选票，因此将在周六举行决胜选举，这场选战激烈。反对派强调国家主权和独立受到威胁，主要原因是印度，这一立场在决胜选举前愈发强调。 穆伊兹明显支持中国，他的政党曾在2013年至2017年间与中国签署自由贸易协定，加入习近平的“一带一路”倡议，并接受了来自中国的数十亿美元贷款。然而，前总统亚明政府也因此政策受到批评，指责他导致马尔代夫陷入了中国的债务陷阱，这被视为导致他在2018年输掉选举的原因之一。 尽管马尔代夫是一个分布广泛、人口仅有50多万人的群岛国家，但它对印度、中国和西方都具有至关重要的战略重要性。它位于重要的东西方货运航线上，包括中国从海湾运输的石油供应。它还被视为对印度洋的更大地缘政治影响和控制的门户，尤其对中国而言，中国在该地区的自信正不断增强。 然而，马尔代夫被视为相对不可预测，直到2008年才摆脱了三十年的专制统治，外交政策在印度和中国之间摇摆不定，政治上腐败和犯罪问题一直困扰着政府。对于印度来说，将中国影响力排除出印度洋是非常重要的，因此在现任索里赫政府领导下，印度在马尔代夫投资超过20亿美元用于基础设施，并增加了培训和安全合作，显然是为了深化影响力。 然而，马尔代夫对印度增加的活动长期以来一直受到怀疑。尤其引发争议的是印度提供给马尔代夫的飞机，印度为了操作这些飞机在该国驻扎了数十名军事人员，导致了印度试图建立战略军事存在的指责。在2022年，前总统亚明开始了一场“印度滚出去”的运动，这个运动也在强硬派伊斯兰团体中获得了支持。尽管索里赫迅速禁止了这项运动，称其为“对国家安全的威胁”，但这只加剧了反印度的言论。 虽然在选举前，印度高级专员馆曾发布声明，谴责当地媒体散布“虚假报道”以威胁高级专员官员，并“不利于印度和马尔代夫之间友好关系”。 尽管中国在表面上保持沉默，但在幕后，北京一直在悄然施加影响，包括邀请记者和政治家前往中国进行全额资助的访问，并开设了自己的文化中心。 在西方，许多国家将反制中国在印太地区的影响视为外交政策的核心任务。在印度洋不远处，坐落着美国迭戈·加西亚海军基地，这个基地在伊拉克和阿富汗的入侵中发挥了核心作用，仍然被视为美国在该地区最关键的基地之一。在九月初的初始选举前，美国开设了马尔代夫的首个大使馆，英国和澳大利亚也最近开设了大使馆。 对于印度和其他国家来说，维护对马尔代夫的一定程度的影响力也是保障地区安全的重要因素。对于连续多届政府未能解决的伊斯兰极端主义和圣战
As the archipelago of the Maldives goes to an election run-off on Saturday, it will not just be two presidential candidates on the ballot.
This election is being pitched as a larger geopolitical battle between India and China, which over the past decade have been engaged in a tug-of-war to gain influence over the Maldives.
While the tussle is not new, the narrative of India versus China has reached a fever pitch in this election, where opposition candidate Mohamed Muizzu is trying to unseat the government of Mohamed Solih and has put resistance to India’s perceived influence over the Maldives at the forefront of his agenda.
Since Solih came to power in a surprise win in 2018, he has moved the country much closer to India – which has historically long ties with the Maldives – while distancing it from Chinese investment that had surged under the previous regime.
Yet Muizzu has accused Solih of endangering the national security of the Maldives with its close ties with India, alleging that the current government has allowed Indian military presence and influence on Maldives territory, which Solih denies.
After neither candidate managed to secure more than 50% of the votes in the first round of elections held in early September, a run-off will be held on Saturday, in a race that is being tightly fought.
“The main opposition narrative is that national sovereignty and independence are under threat, mainly because of India,” said Azim Zahir, a research fellow at the University of Western Australia. “They have been playing up the India threat very vigorously, and increasingly more so in the build up to this run-off election.”
Muizzu’s own allegiances are widely acknowledged to be towards China. When his party, the Progressive Alliance coalition, was previously in power between 2013 and 2017 under President Abdullah Yameen, it pursued a significant pro-China policy, signing a free trade agreement with China and becoming part of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road project, accepting billions of dollars in loans from China. Muizzu, who was mayor of the capital, Male, at the time, spearheaded a $200m bridge project paid for by China.
But Yameen’s government also came under criticism for this policy, and accusations he had led the Maldives into a China debt trap were seen to contribute to his loss in 2018.
‘All for India to lose’
Though it is a widely scattered archipelago with a population of just over 500,000, the Maldives holds crucial strategic importance for India and China as well as the west. It is on the pathway of essential east-west cargo shipping lines, including China’s oil supplies from the Gulf. It is also seen as a gateway to larger geopolitical influence and control over the Indian ocean, particularly for China which is growing increasingly assertive in the region.
Yet it is also seen as somewhat unpredictable, having only become a fragile democracy in 2008 after three decades of authoritarian rule. Foreign policy has oscillated wildly in that time between India and China, while corruption and criminality have remained rampant in politics.
For India, which is engaged in a tense border dispute with China, keeping Chinese influence out of its back yard in the Indian Ocean is seen as highly important and under the current Solih government they have invested over $2bn in infrastructure, as well as increasing training and security cooperation, in an apparent bid to deepen influence.
Earlier this year, India’s foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited the Maldives to give them two sea ambulances and sign several development agreements, while emphasising that India was “always willing” to help the Maldives. They have also utilised soft cultural power, opening a highly active Indian cultural centre in Male.
Yet India’s increased activity has also been long been viewed with suspicion by those in the Maldives.
A particular source of contention have been aircraft given to the Maldives by India, which has stationed dozens of military personnel in the country to operate them, leading to allegations of India trying to set up a strategic military presence.
In 2022, former president Yameen began an “India Out campaign” which also gained traction among the hardline Islamist groups. Though Solih swiftly banned the campaign, terming it a “threat to national security”, it only amplified the anti-India rhetoric.
Such has been the anti-India fervour around the election that last week, the Indian high commission in the Maldives was forced to release a statement calling out “fake reports” in the local media which they said were intended to intimidate high commission officials and “adversely affect the friendly relations between India and Maldives”.
While China has kept quiet on the surface, behind the scenes Beijing has been quietly exerting influence, including inviting journalists and politicians on fully funded trips to China, and opening a cultural centre of its own.
Eyes are also on the election in the west, where for many countries, countering Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific has become a central priority of foreign policy. Not too far away in the Indian Ocean sits the US Diego Garcia naval base, which played a central role in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and is still seen as one of America’s most critical bases in the region. Days before the initial election in September, the US opened its first embassy in the Maldives. The UK and Australia also recently opened embassies.
Regional security is also a crucial factor for India and others in keeping some influence over the Maldives. The concern over Islamist extremism in the country continues to go unaddressed by successive governments and in July, the US treasury department released a list of names of 20 leaders and financial facilitators linked to Islamic State, Isis-Khorasan (Isis-K) and Al-Qa’ida operating in the Maldives.
Nonetheless, Ahmed Shaheed, former Maldives foreign minister, said the geopolitical element of the election had been overblown and it was unlikely that if Muizzu won, as is looking likely, India would be entirely ousted.
“I don’t see a drastic change in the orientation of the modern foreign policy, even if there was a government change: India will likely remain a very strong partner,” he said. “It’s all for India to lose rather than China to gain.”