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The Guardian - Editorial-The Guardian view on Kosovos future Europe must do more Editorial

September 25, 2023   3 min   548 words

这篇报道揭示了科索沃与塞尔维亚之间紧张局势的升级,以及欧洲联盟在调解方面的困境。首先,科索沃总理阿尔宾·库尔蒂对与塞尔维亚关系正常化的谈判失去信心,指责欧洲联盟的调解策略即将陷入僵局。不久后,一次严重升级的事件发生,包括一名科索沃警察在塞尔维亚边境附近遭到不明身份武装人员伏击而丧命。 欧盟及其外交政策负责人何塞普·博雷尔面临外交失败的后果不仅限于科索沃北部,那里拥有大多数塞族人口。在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后,欧盟加倍努力将西巴尔干地区纳入其势力范围,并打击莫斯科的影响力。但周日的枪击事件表明,在这个巴尔干地区的火点上,其方法并不奏效。 显然,去年春季的一个潜在突破性协议要求塞尔维亚承认科索沃的国家地位,以换取北部塞族人口多数的自治权。然而,塞尔维亚总统亚历山大·武奇奇仍然没有签署协议,并公开吹嘘此事。今年四月,他的政府反对科索沃加入欧洲理事会。库尔蒂未能在科索沃塞族人口多数地区实现政治自治,通过部署特警部队激怒了当地人,并主持了一次失败的地方选举,抵制导致投票率仅为4%。 这个复杂的外交舞蹈正面临严重暴力的风险,但博雷尔也需要承担一些责任。库尔蒂坚称,科索沃方面对欧盟特使米洛斯拉夫·莱恰克的“失去中立性”导致了信任的崩溃。今年夏天,一群西方高级政治家也提出了类似的观点,称西方在巴尔干地区采取了“以贝尔格莱德为中心的政策”。布鲁塞尔和华盛顿似乎优先考虑让武奇奇保持支持,因为该国在地区内有影响力,与俄罗斯有重要联系。但这样做会忽视保护科索沃免受大邻国的欺凌和干扰的需要,后者认为科索沃没有存在的权利。考虑到目前的情况和乌克兰的最近历史,库尔蒂对将更多权力交给北部倾向于分裂的科索沃塞族人感到担忧也就不足为奇。与此同时,俄罗斯一直在竭力煽动和利用这种不稳定局势,而塞尔维亚总统常常利用危机来巩固国内的民族主义支持。 一些欧盟成员国指出,库尔蒂也犯了错误。他不明智地加剧了北部的不满,而那里的更多自治势必是任何成功解决方案的一部分。但欧盟也必须整顿自己的家庭。迄今为止,有五个欧盟成员国没有承认科索沃,因为他们认为科索沃独立的情况与他们自己的少数民族问题存在虚假等同。一个更团结的欧洲将在这个动荡而重要的地区成为更有权威和更有效的调解者。 这一报道凸显了科索沃问题的复杂性和欧洲联盟在解决这一问题上所面临的挑战,强调了需要更均衡和更有效的外交努力来维护地区的和平和稳定。

At the weekend, Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, spoke despairingly in relation to a decade of talks about normalising relations with Serbia, which continues to refuse to recognise his country’s independent status. In an interview with the Guardian, Mr Kurti claimed that the negotiations, mediated by the European Union, were in danger of reaching a dead end. Shortly after publication, there was ominous confirmation that a nadir has indeed been reached. In a serious escalation of tensions, five people, including a Kosovan police officer, were killed after an ambush by unidentified armed men near the Serbian border.

For the EU and its foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, the ramifications of diplomatic failure stretch well beyond the fate of the northern tip of Kosovo, with its majority Serb population. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has redoubled its efforts to anchor the western Balkans within its orbit and combat Moscow’s influence. But Sunday’s shootings indicate that in this Balkan hotspot, its approach isn’t working.

An apparent breakthrough agreement last spring obliged Serbia to recognise Kosovo’s nationhood in exchange for semi-autonomous powers for the Serb-majority municipalities in the north. Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, has shamefully still not signed the deal and has publicly bragged about this. In April, his government opposed Kosovo’s bid for membership of the Council of Europe. Mr Kurti has not delivered political self-management in majority Kosovo Serb areas. He has antagonised locals through the deployment of special police units and presided over failed local elections there, in which a boycott led to a 4% turnout.

An elaborate diplomatic dance is thus in danger of tipping into serious violence. But for that, Mr Borell may also need to take some responsibility. Mr Kurti maintains that the collapse in trust on the Kosovan side has resulted from “lost neutrality” on the part of the EU’s special envoy, Miroslav Lajčák. This summer, a group of senior western politicians made much the same point about the west’s “Belgrade-centred policy for the Balkans”.

Brussels and Washington appear to have prioritised the need to keep Mr Vučić onside, given the country’s regional influence and significant ties to Russia. In doing so, they risk neglecting the need to protect Kosovo from the machinations of a bullying and much larger neighbour that believes it has no right to exist. Given the circumstances, and recent history in Ukraine, it is hardly surprising that Mr Kurti should harbour misgivings about handing greater power to separatist-leaning Kosovo Serbs in the north. Meanwhile in the background, Russia has done its best to foment and exploit the instability, while the Serbian president habitually manipulates the crisis to shore up nationalist support at home.

Some EU states point out that Mr Kurti has made mistakes too. He has unwisely fuelled resentments in the north, where greater autonomy will inevitably be part of any successful settlement. But this is a final-status issue that should go hand in hand with real moves from Belgrade. The EU also has to get its own house in order. Five EU members have so far not recognised Kosovo because of a false equivalence between the circumstances of its independence and their own minority issues. A more united Europe would be a more authoritative and effective mediator in a troubled and vital region.