纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英中国房地产危机拉响新警报影子银行

An accountant in northeast China deposited her life savings and received a letter guaranteeing her investment in a trust firm. Workers at a state-owned utility pooled money from friends and relatives believing that their investments were backed by the government. A man sank $140,000 into an account that he was told would make a 10.1 percent annual return.

一名家住东北的会计师将毕生积蓄存进了一家信托投资公司，并收到了一封保证函。一家国有公用事业公司的工人以为他们的投资有政府保底，于是把来自亲朋好友的钱集中起来投给了这家公司。一名男子购买了100万元的投资产品，因为他被告知产品的年回报率是10.1%。

They are among the hundreds of thousands of Chinese investors confronting a distressing reality: Their investments with Zhongzhi Enterprise Group, a financial giant managing $140 billion in assets, and its trust banking arm, Zhongrong, might be at risk. Starting in July, companies affiliated with Zhongzhi missed dozens of payments to investors. They have offered no timetable for when people will be paid, fueling concerns that one of China’s largest so-called shadow banks may be near collapse.

包括他们在内的数十万名中国投资者正面临着一个严峻的现实：管理资产规模约1万亿元的中植企业集团及其旗下的中融信托公司可能面临风险。自今年7月以来，中植旗下的公司已多次出现投资者资金到期后逾期未付的情况。公司没有提供支付时间表，这加剧了人们对中国最大的所谓“影子银行”之一可能濒临崩溃的担忧。

In a brief statement last week, Zhongrong said some investment products were “unable to be paid on schedule” because of “multiple internal and external factors.” It did not mention whether investors would get their money. Zhongzhi has not made any public statements about its finances, and it did not respond to an email seeking comment.

中融信托上周在一份简短声明中写道，“受内外部多重因素影响，本公司部分信托产品无法按期兑付。”声明未提及投资者是否会拿到他们的钱。中植集团没有对自己的财务状况发表任何公开声明，也没有回复记者寻求置评的电子邮件。

Zhongzhi’s problems are the latest ripple effects from China’s property crisis, which is wreaking havoc in the country’s financial system and piling pressure on a central government navigating a troubling economic slump. They have ignited new fears about China’s shadow banks — financial firms that offer lending and investment services but are not subject to the same regulations as conventional banks. These firms doled out credit to property developers for the country’s construction boom, and now many borrowers are defaulting on loans as new home sales have stagnated.

“中植系”的问题是中国房地产危机带来的连锁反应的最新一波。房地产危机正给中国金融体系造成严重破坏，也给正在应对经济衰退的中央政府带来了巨大压力。这场危机已引发了人们对中国影子银行的新担忧，影子银行指的是提供贷款和投资服务，但不受传统银行接受的那种监管的金融公司。这些公司曾为房地产开发商们提供了大量信贷，推动了中国的盖楼热潮，但由于新房销售停滞，许多开发商现在无法还贷。

Trust firms like Zhongrong are an arm of the shadow banks that sell investment products to Chinese companies and wealthy individuals. They face few requirements to publicly disclose information about their operations, including how they invest client money. And they are gigantic: Trust firms manage $3 trillion in assets, enticing investors with high-yield financial products that many investors believed were backstopped by the government. The trusts extend loans or invest in assets such as real estate, stocks and bonds — money that keeps China’s economy and markets moving.

中融这样的信托公司是影子银行的一个部门，它们向中国企业和富人出售投资产品，但几乎不需要公开披露有关其运营的信息，包括如何投资客户的资金。它们规模庞大：信托公司管理着逾21万亿元的资产，它们用高收益的金融产品来吸引投资者，许多投资者认为这些产品有政府保底。信托公司发放贷款，或投资房地产、股票和债券等资产，这些资金维持着中国的经济和市场运转。

Zhongzhi is a privately owned conglomerate with businesses that span venture capital, asset management and insurance. One of its crown jewels is a 33 percent stake in Zhongrong International Trust, which held $86 billion in investments in 2022.

中植是一家民营企业集团，业务涵盖风险投资、资产管理和保险。中植皇冠上的一颗明珠是其持有的中融国际信托公司33%的股份，后者2022年直接管理着近6300亿元的信托资产。

Zhongrong’s statement, issued after weeks of silence, said it had brought in two state-owned companies for support, deepening the intrigue about Beijing’s thinking. For decades, China has bailed out indebted financial firms, leading many to believe that the products offered by trusts — especially ones with ties to state-owned enterprises — were essentially guaranteed by the government.

中融信托的上述声明是在沉默数周后发布的，声明称已与两家国有企业签订了由它们提供专业服务的协议，这加深了围绕着中央政府想法的揣测。几十年来，中国一直帮助负债累累的金融公司脱离困境，让许多人认为信托公司提供的产品——尤其是与国有企业有关系的产品——本质上由政府担保。

But this safety net, critics argued, created a moral hazard that allowed investors to ignore the risks associated with high-yield investments, while encouraging trust firms to engage in the type of risky lending that Beijing has been looking to curb.

但批评者认为，这个安全网制造了道德隐患，让投资者忽视了与高收益投资相关的风险，同时鼓励信托公司发放高风险贷款，这类贷款是政府一直想遏制的。

In a message to investors last week, an employee of Datang Wealth Management, a company controlled by Zhongzhi that sells Zhongrong products, perpetuated the idea that the government would not abandon them.

中植旗下的大唐财富投资管理有限公司销售中融信托产品，该公司的一名员工在上周发给投资者的短信中延续了政府不会放弃他们的说法。

“Our trust contracts are all true and valid,” the employee wrote in a message shared with The New York Times. “And it is a leading trust company with a central-government-owned enterprise background, so our payment problem will definitely be solved, and the result will not disappoint.”

“我们的信托合同都是真实有效的，”有人分享给《纽约时报》的该员工短信写道。“更何况还是头部的信托公司，又是央企背景，所以，我们的兑付问题一定会解決的，而且結果不会令大家失望的！"。”

Zhongrong’s biggest investor is Jingwei Textile Machinery, a state-owned enterprise, while Datang shares the name of its minority shareholder, Datang International Power Generation, a state-owned utility. Last month, Jingwei announced that it was pulling its shares off the stock market, citing “significant uncertainties” without mentioning Zhongrong.

中融信托最大的投资者是国企经纬纺织机械，大唐财富则与中融信托的少数股东——国企大唐发电同名。上个月，经纬纺机宣布主动退市，理由是“经营面临重大不确定性”，但没有提中融信托。

The accountant in northeast China said she had invested $1.5 million into two Zhongrong trust products. While she knew little about Zhongrong, she felt safe because its largest shareholder is a state-owned firm and it had a license from China’s banking regulator. She said she had received a commitment letter promising to make up any shortfall in her investment.

前文提及的那名来自中国东北的会计师说，她投了1000万元，买了两个中融信托产品。虽然她对中融信托并没有多少了解，但因为其最大的股东是一家国有企业，中融信托有中国银行业监管机构发的经营牌照，她觉得投资其产品很安全。她说，她曾收到一份保证弥补任何本金不足的承诺书。

But when her $550,000 investment into one of the funds matured last month, she did not receive her principal or her 7.6 percent interest after a year. She said the company would not reassure her that she would be paid. After she visited a local financial regulator to lodge a complaint, a police officer warned her not to appeal to a higher authority. She asked to be identified only by her surname, Ms. Wang, for fear of further reprisals.

但当她的一个400万元的投资产品上个月到期后，她不仅没有收到按7.6%的年息计算的一年利息，也没有收到本金。她说，公司已不再向她保证她能把钱拿回来。她去当地一家金融监管机构投诉后，一名警察警告她不要去上级部门告状。由于担心遭到进一步的报复，她要求记者只写她姓王。

“It’s like my heart is bleeding every day,” Ms. Wang said, sobbing on the phone. She had planned to buy a home for her child in Beijing with the money she had invested.

“现在可以说真的是度日如年，就是每天这个心就像流血一样，”王女士在电话中抽泣着说。她本打算用这笔钱在北京给孩子买一套房子。

After Zhongrong missed its payments, angry investors gathered outside its Beijing headquarters, demanding that the company “pay back the money.”

中融信托出现资金逾期未付的问题后，愤怒的投资者们聚集在公司的北京总部外，要求公司“还钱”。

While Ms. Wang and other investors are desperate for government intervention, Beijing might be reluctant to engineer a bailout.

尽管王女士和其他投资者们迫切希望政府出面干预，但中央政府也许不愿给予中融信托财政援助。

Around 2016, China started trying to defuse the risk posed by its growing debt. Regulators limited banks from funneling funds into trust firms to circumvent rules preventing risky lending. In 2020, it limited debt-laden property developers from borrowing more.

2016年前后，中国开始试图化解债务不断增长带来的风险。监管机构限制了银行为规避防止高风险贷款的规定，将资金输送给信托公司的做法。2020年，监管机构对负债累累的房地产开发商借更多的钱进行了限制。

China’s policymakers now face a predicament. They could stay the course, risking social stability from the economic fallout. Or they could bail out firms to prop up the economy but undermine the message that risky behavior has consequences.

中国的决策者现在面临一种困境。如果他们不救助“中植系”的话，其经济后果可能带来社会不稳定的风险。如果他们为支持经济出面救助陷入困境的公司的话，就会削弱政府希望释放的信息，即风险做法存在后果。

In 2020, regulators took over Xinhua Trust and New Era Trust — two of China’s 68 licensed trust firms at the time — for what it called “illegal business operations.” Three years later, Xinhua became the first trust firm to declare bankruptcy in over 20 years.

2020年，监管机构曾以“非法经营”为由接管了新华信托和新纪元信托，它们是中国68家持牌信托公司中的两家。三年后，新华信托已成为20多年来第一家宣布破产的信托公司。

Logan Wright, director of China markets research at Rhodium Group, said China used to embrace bailouts, because faith in a government backstop allowed credit to flow for a fast-growing economy. But as China’s debts ballooned, the government changed course.

荣鼎咨询中国市场研究总监洛根·赖特说，中国以前愿意施救金融公司，因为有政府保底的信心让信贷能在快速增长的经济中流动。但随着中国的债务越来越高，政府已改变了做法。

“That strategy is now coming to an end,” he said.

“以前的策略现在正在结束，”他说。

But it was the veneer of government support that reassured nearly 1,000 employees at a power plant in eastern China to invest with Datang Wealth Management for products offered by Zhongrong and Zhongzhi. The sales pitch came from a finance official in their state-owned company, and the workers understood that Zhongrong and Datang had the partial backing of state-owned firms, according to a person who had permission to speak on behalf of some employees. The plant employees were worried about the consequences of speaking out.

但正是有政府保底的表象让中国东部一家电厂的近千名员工放心地购买了大唐财富销售的中融信托和中植产品。据一名获准代表部分员工发言的人说，推销者是自他们所在国企的一名财务负责人，而且工人们知道中融信托和大唐财富背后有国有企业的部分支持。电厂工人们对公开发声的后果表示担心。

In many cases, employees combined money from relatives and friends to invest in products offering annual returns of up to 10 percent, this person said.

宣传称投资产品有最高10%的年回报率，许多工人把来自亲朋好友的钱集中起来购买了投资产品，代表工人发言的人说。

In late July, the investors were told that redemptions were delayed but that “everyone’s principal won’t be affected,” according to a screenshot of a WeChat message.

今年7月下旬，投资者被告知产品赎回被推迟，但“大家的本金不会受到影响”，据微信截图显示。

Zhongzhi told investors two weeks later that it was conducting “asset liquidation and capital verification” and delaying redemptions.

两周后，中植告诉投资者们，正在进行“资产清算和验资”，再次推迟了赎回。

As time passed without payment, the company colleague who served as a Datang intermediary warned employees not to complain or they might be moved to the back of the line for redemptions.

中植多次推迟后仍未付款，曾给大唐财富当中介的公司同事警告员工不要去告状，否则他们会被安排在产品赎回排队的后面。

But some investors are refusing to stay quiet.

但一些投资者拒绝保持沉默。

Zhou Chunlei, who had invested $140,000 with a Zhongzhi subsidiary, was supposed to receive his first interest payment in July. When he didn’t receive the money, he took the rare step of speaking out by his real identity on Chinese social media.

购买了中植一家子公司100万元产品的周春雷本应在7月拿到第一笔利息。他在没收到钱后采取了罕见的做法，在中国社交媒体上公开了自己的真实身份。

“Rather than waiting, it is better to fight for our personal interests,” Mr. Zhou said in a video. “I also hope that the government can solve the problems for the people and the investors.”

“与其等待不如去争取我们的个人利益，”周春雷在一段视频中说。“也希望政府能够为老百姓为我们这些投资人排忧解难。”