纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英无所不在的战场美中在全球展开谍战较量
September 19, 2023 12 min 2508 words
虽然你身处的环境，或多或少会影响你的心情，但有些事也依然取决于你自己。
As China’s spy balloon drifted across the continental United States in February, American intelligence agencies learned that President Xi Jinping of China had become enraged with senior Chinese military generals.
美国情报机构获悉，当中国的间谍气球于今年2月飘过美国大陆时，中国国家主席习近平曾对军方高层大发雷霆。
The spy agencies had been trying to understand what Mr. Xi knew and what actions he would take as the balloon, originally aimed at U.S. military bases in Guam and Hawaii, was blown off course.
原本以关岛和夏威夷的美军基地为目标的气球被吹离航线后，间谍机构一直试图了解习近平究竟知道多少情况，以及他会采取什么行动。
Mr. Xi was not opposed to risky spying operations against the United States, but American intelligence agencies concluded that the People’s Liberation Army had kept Mr. Xi in the dark until the balloon was over the United States.
习近平并不反对针对美国的冒险间谍行动，但美国情报机构认定，在人民解放军的气球飞越美国上空之前，习近平并不知情。
American officials would not discuss how spy agencies gleaned this information. But in details reported here for the first time, they discovered that when Mr. Xi learned of the balloon’s trajectory and realized it was derailing planned talks with Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, he berated senior generals for failing to tell him that the balloon had gone astray, according to American officials briefed on the intelligence.
美国官员不愿具体讲述情报机构是如何收集到这些信息的。但根据本文首次曝光的一些细节，据了解情报的美国官员称，他们发现，当习近平得知气球飘到了美国，并干扰到与美国国务卿布林肯原定的会谈时，他怒斥军队高级将领没有告诉他气球偏离航线的事情。
The episode threw a spotlight on the expanding and highly secretive spy-versus-spy contest between the United States and China. The balloon crisis, a small part of a much larger Chinese espionage effort, reflects a brazen new aggressiveness by Beijing in gathering intelligence on the United States as well as Washington’s growing capabilities to collect its own information on China.
该事件让美中之间不为外人所知、日益扩大的谍战较量曝光。气球危机只是中国大规模间谍活动的一小部分，它反映出北京在收集美国情报发面肆无忌惮的新态势，也反映了华盛顿收集中国情报的能力日益增强。
For Washington, the espionage efforts are a critical part of President Biden’s strategy to constrain the military and technological rise of China, in line with his thinking that the country poses the greatest long-term challenge to American power.
对于华盛顿来说，间谍活动是拜登总统遏制中国军事和技术崛起战略的重要组成部分，这与他所持观点相一致，即中国对美国实力构成了最大的长期挑战。
For Beijing, the new tolerance for bold action among Chinese spy agencies is driven by Mr. Xi, who has led his military to engage in aggressive moves along the nation’s borders and pushed his foreign intelligence agency to become more active in farther-flung locales.
对于北京来说，对中国间谍机构大胆行动采取一种新的纵容态度是由习近平所推动的，在他的指挥下，军方在中国边境采取激进的手段，并推动对外情报机构在更远的地方展开更多的行动
The main efforts on both sides are aimed at answering the two most difficult questions: What are the intentions of leaders in the rival nation, and what military and technological capabilities do they command?
双方的主要努力都是为了回答两个最困难的问题：敌对方的领导人有何意图；以及他们掌握着怎样的军事和技术能力。
American officials, most of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss espionage, have stressed in interviews throughout the year the magnitude of the challenge. The C.I.A. is focusing on Mr. Xi himself, and in particular his intentions regarding Taiwan. The F.B.I.’s counterintelligence task forces across the nation have intensified their hunt for Chinese efforts to recruit spies inside the United States. U.S. agents have identified a dozen penetrations by Chinese citizens of military bases on American soil in the last 12 months.
在今年内进行的采访中，美国官员都在强调这一挑战的严重性。由于讨论间谍活动，他们中大多数人都要求匿名。中情局关注的是习近平本人，尤其是他对台湾的意图。联邦调查局在全美各地的反间谍团队加大了对中国在美国境内招募间谍的追查力度。在过去12个月里，美国特工已经发现了十几起中国公民渗透美国境内军事基地的事件。
Both countries are racing to develop their artificial intelligence technology, which they believe is critical to maintaining a military and economic edge and will give their spy agencies new capabilities.
两国都在竞相开发人工智能技术，他们认为这对于保持军事和经济优势至关重要，而且将提高两国间谍机构的能力。
Taken together, U.S. officials say, China’s efforts reach across every facet of national security, diplomacy and advanced commercial technology in the United States and partner nations.
美国官员说，总体来看，中国的谍报行动涉及美国及其伙伴国家的国家安全、外交和先进民用技术的方方面面。
The C.I.A. and the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency have set up new centers focused on spying on China. U.S. officials have honed their capabilities to intercept electronic communications, including using spy planes off China’s coast.
中情局和五角大楼的国防情报局已经建立了专注于刺探中国情报的中心。美国官员在改进窃听电子通讯的能力，包括在中国海岸线使用间谍飞机。
The spy conflict with China is even more expansive than the one that played out between the Americans and the Soviets during the Cold War, said Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director. China’s large population and economy enable it to build intelligence services that are bigger than those of the United States.
联邦调查局局长克里斯托夫弗·雷表示，与中国的间谍冲突范围之广，甚至超过了冷战期间美苏之间的间谍战。中国拥有规模更大的人口和经济，可以建起比美国更大的情报机构。
“The fact is that compared to the P.R.C., we’re vastly outnumbered on the ground, but it’s on us to defend the American people here at home,” Mr. Wray said in an interview, using the initials for the People’s Republic of China. “I view this as the challenge of our generation.”
“现实是比起PRC，我们在一线上是在以寡敌众，但是在本土保卫美国人民是我们的责任，”弗雷在一次采访中说，他在这里使用了中华人民共和国的缩写。“我认为这是我们这一代人要面对的挑战。”
China sees it differently. Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, has said that “it is the U.S. that is the No. 1 surveillance country and has the largest spy network in the world.”
中国不这么认为。中国外交部发言人汪文斌称，“美国才是全球最大监控侦察国家，拥有世界上最大规模的间谍网络。”
‘Going After Everything’
“无所不在”
Espionage can halt a slide into war or smooth the path of delicate negotiations, but it can also speed nations toward armed conflict or cause diplomatic rifts.
谍报活动可以遏止一场战争的爆发，或为审慎的谈判铺平道路，但也可以让一个国家更快地走向武装冲突或导致外交纠纷。
In late February, weeks after he canceled an important trip to Beijing over the balloon episode, Mr. Blinken confronted China’s top diplomat with a U.S. intelligence assessment that Beijing was considering giving weapons to Russia. That disclosure raised tensions, but also might be keeping China from sending the arms, U.S. officials say. And when Mr. Blinken finally went to Beijing in June, he raised the issue of Chinese intelligence activities in Cuba.
2月底，也就是因气球事件而取消了重要的访华之行几周后，布林肯就美国的一项情报评估当面质问中国最高外交官，称北京在考虑向俄罗斯提供武器。美国官员认为，这样的公开披露会导致局势紧张，但同时也可能阻止中国提供武器。6月终于前往北京后，布林肯提到了中国在古巴的情报活动问题。
China’s vastly improved satellite reconnaissance and its cyberintrusions are its most important means of collecting intelligence, U.S. officials say. The fleet of spy balloons, though far less sophisticated, has allowed China to exploit the unregulated zone of “near space.” And the U.S. government is warning allies that China’s electronic surveillance capabilities could expand if the world’s nations use technology from Chinese communications companies.
Artificial intelligence is another battleground. The U.S. government sees its lead in A.I. as a way to help offset China’s strength in numbers. Chinese officials hope the technology will help them counter American military power, including by pinpointing U.S. submarines and establishing domination of space, U.S. officials say.
人工智能是另一个战场。美国政府认为自己在人工智能领域的领先地位有助于抵消中国在数量上的优势。美国官员称，中国官员希望这项技术能帮助他们对抗美国的军事力量，包括精确定位美国潜艇和建立对太空的统治。
American officials are also more concerned than ever at Chinese agencies’ efforts to gather intelligence through personal contacts. They say China’s main intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security, aims to place agents or recruit assets across the U.S. government, as well as in technology companies and the defense industry.
美国官员也比以往任何时候都更加关注中国机构通过个人接触收集情报的行为。他们说，中国的主要情报机构国家安全部的目标是在美国政府、科技公司和国防工业中安插特工或招募人员。
Chinese agents use social media sites — LinkedIn in particular — to lure potential recruits. Any time an American takes a publicly disclosed intelligence job, they can expect a barrage of outreach from Chinese citizens on social media, according to current and former officials.
中国特工利用社交媒体网站——尤其是LinkedIn——来吸引潜在的招募对象。根据现任和前任官员的说法，只要一名美国人接受了公开披露的情报工作，就会在社交媒体上收到中国公民的密集联络。
Responding to that threat, federal agencies have quietly opened or expanded their in-house spy catching operations. And Mr. Wray said the F.B.I. has thousands of open Chinese intelligence investigations, and every one of its 56 field offices has active cases. All of those field offices now have counterintelligence and cyber task forces largely focused on the threat from Chinese intelligence.
为了应对这一威胁，联邦机构已悄悄开展或扩大了内部间谍抓捕行动。雷表示，联邦调查局有数千起中国情报调查正在进行中，其56个地区办事处中的每一个都有正在处理的案件。所有这些办事处现在都配备反情报和网络特别工作组，主要关注来自中国情报部门的威胁。
Those investigations involve attempts by Chinese spies to recruit informants, steal information, hack into systems and monitor and harass Chinese dissidents in the United States, including using so-called police outposts.
这些调查涉及中国间谍试图招募线人、窃取信息、侵入网络系统，以及使用包括所谓“海外警务站”的手法监视和骚扰住在美国的中国异见人士等。
“They’re going after everything,” Mr. Wray said. “What makes the P.R.C. intelligence apparatus so pernicious is the way it uses every means at its disposal against us all at once, blending cyber, human intelligence, corporate transactions and investments to achieve its strategic goals.”
“他们无所不用其极，”雷说。“让PRC情报机构的危害如此之大的是，它使用一切可利用的手段展开对我们不利的突然行动，为实现它的战略目标，将网络和线人情报，以及公司交易和投资等活动混在一起。”
But critics say some of the U.S. government’s counterintelligence efforts are racially biased and paranoid, amounting to a new Red Scare — a charge at least partly supported by the cases the Justice Department has had to drop and by its shutdown of the Trump-era China Initiative program.
China has undertaken its own expansive counterintelligence crusade, one that echoes Mao-era political campaigns. On July 1, China enacted a sweeping expansion of a counterespionage law. And in August, the Ministry of State Security announced that “all members of society” should help fight foreign spying, and offered rewards for anyone providing information.
The rival governments have also established new listening posts and secret intelligence-sharing agreements with other governments. American and Chinese agents have intensified their operations against each other in pivotal cities, from Brussels to Abu Dhabi to Singapore, with each side looking to influence foreign officials and recruit well-placed assets.
对立双方的政府还建立了新的监听站，并与其他国家的政府达成了秘密的情报共享协议。美国和中国的特工都在从布鲁塞尔到阿布扎比、再到新加坡等关键城市加强针对对方的行动，都在试图影响外国官员，招募处于有利地位的情报人员。
The Art of Mind-Reading
看透心思的艺术
For American spy agencies, Mr. Xi’s decisions and intentions are arguably the most valuable intelligence they seek, but he is also the most elusive of targets.
对美国间谍机构来说，习近平的决定和意图可以说是他们想得到的最有价值的情报，但他也是最难触及的目标。
U.S. agencies are now probing exactly why China’s defense minister, Gen. Li Shangfu, appears to have been placed under investigation for corruption, and why Mr. Xi ousted Qin Gang, his foreign minister. American diplomacy and policy depend on knowing the motivations behind these moves.
A decade ago, the United States’ network of informants in China was eliminated by Chinese counterintelligence officials after the informants’ identities were uncovered. Since then, the C.I.A. has faced a major challenge to rebuild its network. That is partly because China’s expanding webs of electronic surveillance have made it difficult for American case officers to move freely in China to meet contacts.
十年前，美国在中国的线人网络在线人身份曝光后被中国反情报官员摧毁。那之后，中情局在重建间谍网上一直面临着重大挑战，部分原因是中国不断扩大的电子监控网络已让美国情报官员难以在中国自由行动，与联系人见面。
China even has artificial intelligence software that can recognize faces and detect the gait of an American spy, meaning traditional disguises are not enough to avoid detection, according to a former intelligence official. American operatives now must spend days rather than hours taking routes to spot any tailing Chinese agents before meeting a source or exchanging messages, former intelligence officials say.
据一名前情报官员说，中国甚至有可以识别美国间谍面孔、检测其步态的人工智能软件，这意味着传统的伪装已不足以躲避侦查。前情报官员们称，美国特工现在需要花数天而非数小时的时间走迂回路线，以便发现和甩掉尾随其后的中国特工，然后才能与线人见面或交换信息。
And Mr. Xi, like other authoritarian leaders, limits his use of phones or electronic communications, for the very purpose of making it difficult for foreign intelligence agencies to intercept his orders.
与其他专制领导人一样，习近平极少使用电话或电子通讯设备，目的就是让外国情报机构难以拦截他的指令。
But officials in the vast bureaucracy under Mr. Xi do use electronic devices, giving U.S. agencies a chance to intercept information — what spies call signals intelligence — to give them some insight into the internal discussions of their Chinese counterparts.
但在习近平手下的庞大官僚机构工作的官员们倒是使用电子设备，这让美国情报部门有机会拦截间谍们称之为信号情报的信息，从而让他们对中国官员的内部讨论有所了解。
In the balloon incident, the C.I.A. began tracking the balloon in mid-January, when the Chinese army launched it from Hainan Island, officials said.
情报官员称，在间谍气球事件中，中情局从今年1月中旬起，也就是中国军队在海南岛将其升空后就开始跟踪该气球。
U.S. officials also determined that commanders on the Central Military Commission that Mr. Xi chairs were unaware of this particular flight until it was tipping into crisis, and they vented their frustration at the generals overseeing the surveillance program.
美国官员也已断定，习近平担任主席的中共中央军事委员会的指挥官们在事情变成危机之前不知道这次行动，他们已对负责间谍气球项目的军官们表示了不满。
Since that crisis, China has paused the operations of its fleet of balloons, but American officials said they believe Beijing will likely restart the program later.
自那次危机以来，中国已暂停了间谍气球项目的运行，但美国官员表示，他们认为中国政府可能会在晚些时候重启该项目。
Under William J. Burns, the C.I.A. director since 2021, the agency has hired more China experts, increased spending on China-related efforts and created a new mission center on China. And while American officials refuse to discuss details of the agency’s network of informants, Mr. Burns said publicly in July that it had made progress on rebuilding a “strong human intelligence capability.”
在2021年担任中情局局长的威廉·伯恩斯领导下，中情局已雇佣更多中国问题专家，增加了与中国有关的经费，并成立了一个针对中国的新任务中心。尽管美国官员们拒绝讨论中情局线人网络的细节，但伯恩斯曾在今年7月公开表示，中情局在重建“强大的人类情报能力”上取得了进展。
While it is unclear how robust the new network is, some U.S. officials think Mr. Xi’s extremely authoritarian governance style gives intelligence agencies an opening to recruit disaffected Chinese citizens, including from among the political and business elite who had benefited in previous decades from less party control and a less ideological leadership.
虽然尚不清楚这个新网络有多强大，但一些美国官员认为，习近平极度威权的治理作风为情报机构提供了招募心怀不满的中国公民的机会，包括从那些在过去几十年里（中共控制较少、领导层不太意识形态化）受益的政商精英当中。
Some prominent Chinese figures, including “princelings” of Communist Party elite families, say in private conversations that they disagree with the turn China has taken.
一些中国知名人士，包括中共精英家族出身的“太子党们”在私下谈话中说，他们对中国已发生的变化感到不满。
China has also poured resources into determining the thinking of top American officials. A Justice Department indictment unsealed in July suggests Chinese businesspeople tied to the government were trying to recruit James Woolsey, a former C.I.A. director who was in the running to be a Trump administration national security cabinet official right after the 2016 election.
中国也为搞清楚美国高级官员的想法投入大量资源。美国司法部今年7月公开的一份起诉书暗示，与政府有联系的中国商人曾试图招募中情局前局长詹姆斯·伍尔西，他曾在2016年的总统大选后争取进入特朗普政府内阁担任国家安全官员。
More recently, a sophisticated, highly targeted penetration of Microsoft’s cloud computing platform gave China access to the emails of senior State Department diplomats, including the American ambassador in Beijing and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo.
中国最近对微软云计算平台进行了一次复杂巧妙的高度针对性渗透，从而获取了美国国务院高级外交官的电子邮件，包括美国驻华大使和商务部长雷蒙多的电子邮件。
American officials traveling to China take elaborate countermeasures to avoid having government secrets pilfered. They are issued burner cellphones and laptops and told to leave their regular devices at home.
前往中国的美国官员采取周密的反间谍措施，以免政府机密被窃取。政府发给他们一次性手机和笔记本电脑，要求他们将平时使用的设备留在家里。
Dennis Wilder, a former U.S. intelligence analyst on China and a senior fellow at Georgetown University, said that discerning the intentions of American leaders is one of the very top priorities for Chinese intelligence agencies.
伟德宁(Dennis Wilder)曾在美国政府担任中国情报分析师，现任乔治城大学高级研究员，他说，了解美国领导人的意图是中国情报部门的首要任务之一。
“They look for senior planning and intentions,” he said. “What is the secretary of state really thinking? What is he really doing? What are the operations the C.I.A. is really running against you?”
“他们想掌握高层计划和意图，”他说。“国务卿到底在想什么？他到底在做什么？中情局有哪些真正与你作对的行动？”
Measuring Military Muscle
衡量军力
No issue in U.S.-China relations has loomed larger than Taiwan. It is the flashpoint likeliest to lead to war, analysts say. Mr. Xi has said China must take control of Taiwan, a de facto independent island, and has ordered his military to be capable of doing so by 2027. But so far, the United States and its allies do not appear to have concrete intelligence on whether Mr. Xi would be willing to order an invasion.
中美关系中没有一个问题比台湾问题更令人担忧了。分析人士称，台湾是最有可能引发战争的爆发点。习近平表示，中国必须收复事实上独立的台湾，并已命令解放军在2027年前做好行动准备。但到目前为止，美国及其盟国似乎还没有习近平是否愿意下达入侵令的具体情报。
And China obsesses over the flip side of the question. Mr. Biden has declared four times that the U.S. military will defend Taiwan should China try to seize the island. But whether Mr. Biden really means that — and whether American leaders plan to permanently keep Taiwan out of China’s reach — are believed to be focal points of some of China’s intelligence efforts.
中国则着迷于台湾问题的另一面。拜登已四次宣称，如果中国试图夺取台湾，美国军队将保卫台湾。但拜登的话是否当真，以及美国领导人是否有让台湾永久处于中国控制之外的计划，据认是中国一些情报工作的关注点。
In the absence of real intelligence on intentions, American and Chinese officials are focused on gathering information on each other’s military capabilities. The United States, for instance, has stepped up its aerial surveillance of Chinese military bases.
在对意图缺乏确凿情报的情况下，美中官员都把注意力集中在收集有关彼此军事能力的信息上。例如，美国已加强了对中国军事基地的空中监视。
Meanwhile, Chinese intelligence agents have penetrated many parts of the Taiwanese government over the decades, former U.S. intelligence officials say. Chinese agents are now trying to learn more about the Biden administration’s efforts to outfit Taiwan with certain weapons systems and provide secret training for Taiwanese troops. Chinese agents also seek more details on the growing military cooperation between the United States and Asian allies.
“What is it all for?” asked Representative Mike Gallagher, Republican of Wisconsin and chairman of the House’s new China committee, referring to Beijing’s espionage efforts. “My speculation, based on what we see around our military bases, based on their cyberhacks, is that it is all geared toward Taiwan.”
“这一切是为了什么？”威斯康星州共和党众议员迈克·加拉格尔在谈到北京的间谍活动时问道，他是众议院新设立的中国委员会的主席。“据我们在我方军事基地周围看到的情况，以及他们在网上进行的黑客行动，我的猜测是，这一切都是针对台湾的。”
Other U.S. officials also say China’s desire to learn more about American armed readiness explains its attempts to surveil military bases around the United States. In the last 12 months, according to U.S. officials, they have tracked about a dozen attempts by Chinese citizens to sneak on to military bases to take photos or measure electromagnetic activity. Some of the recent efforts appear focused on bases that would play an important role in a Taiwan conflict, they say.
其他美国官员也表示，中国渴望对美国使用武器的准备有更多的了解，这是中国试图监视美国各地军事基地的原因。据美国官员说，在过去的12个月里，他们已追查到大约十几起中国公民偷偷进入军事基地拍照或测量电磁活动的尝试。他们说，最近的一些努力似乎集中在那些将在台湾冲突中起重要作用的基地上。
In August, the Justice Department charged two American sailors with providing military secrets to Chinese intelligence agents. The sailors pleaded not guilty.
今年8月，美国司法部指控两名美国海军水手向中国情报人员提供军事机密。水手们不认罪。
But intelligence collection is not in itself a prelude to war. The espionage struggle actually could be a substitute for armed clashes, as it often was during the Cold War.
但情报收集本身并不是战争的前奏。间谍斗争其实可以替代武装冲突，就像冷战期间经常发生的那样。
U.S. intelligence officials believe that China does not want to go to war now over Taiwan, Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, told Congress in March.
美国情报官员认为，中国目前不想就台湾问题发动战争，国家情报总监艾薇儿·海恩斯今年3月在国会听证会上说。
“We assess that Beijing still believes it benefits most,” she said, “by preventing a spiraling of tensions and by preserving stability in its relationship with the United States.”
“我们的评估是，北京仍相信，让自己受益最大的做法是通过防止紧张局势升级，通过保持与美国关系的稳定，”她说。