Reuters-Explainer Chinas military hierarchy under spotlight after defence minister disappears
September 18, 2023 4 min 696 words
这则报道揭示了中国国防部长李尚福的失踪引发的问题，突显了中国解放军（PLA）的不透明和复杂性。根据报道，李正在接受有关其在之前职务中腐败采购军事装备的调查，而另外八名高级官员也在接受调查，但他的命运尚未得到正式解释。 李尚福在中国体制中的地位相对较低，与美国国防部长以及许多国际等同者相比，被视为显著较弱。这个职位本质上是一种外交和礼仪职能，没有直接的指挥职能。然而，李是六名在中央军事委员会核心下的军事官员之一，由中国国家主席习近平担任统帅，他还是五名国务委员之一，地位高于普通内阁部长。他被视为一位航空工程师，曾在中国的卫星项目中工作，据军事专家和分析人士称，他被认为是协助实施习近平对PLA现代化愿景的技术官员。 中国解放军是执政的共产党的武装力量，根据五角大楼关于中国军事的年度报告，“并不直接为国家服务，而是在党的直接控制下”。随着李在职业生涯中的晋升，他将被审查以确保他对党和习的绝对忠诚。解放军仍然运作着一支活跃的政治委员队伍，位于指挥链旁，负责确保忠诚、团结和士气。这种政委制度在传统的共产主义军队之外并没有明确的等同物。中央军事委员会是党在军事事务上的最高决策机构，根据五角大楼2022年11月发布的报告称，“自习近平成为中央军事委员会主席以来，他已经实施了多项改革，减少了解放军的自主权，大大加强了党对军队的控制”，这在常规军事机密之上增加了一层不透明度，外国国防官员审查了解放军。 这些体制性的差异确实重要。解放军已经是世界上最大的军事力量，正在变得更有能力和现代化。随着它吸收新武器，它的体制也在发生变化，近年来新的统一地区指挥部和战略支援部队的创建覆盖了它的太空和网络战能力——李在2016年曾担任战略支援部队的副司令。随着解放军的实力和影响力不断扩大，外国军队渴望了解它的运作方式以及其领导层的战略意图，这是军事外交的基础，解放军的外交活动受到内部安全打压的担忧已经引起了一些外交官和分析人士的担忧。 美国国防部长急于恢复与中国同行的常规交流，面临地区紧张局势。然而，李曾于2018年因购买俄罗斯武器而受到美国制裁，他在今年6月新加坡与美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀进行正式会谈时回避了正式讨论。在马耳他举行的白宫国家安全顾问杰克·沙利文和中国外交部长王毅之间的周末会谈后，美国官员表示他们注意到了“有限”的迹象表明沟通寒冷可能会缓解。即使中国宣布了新的国防部长并允许他们与奥斯汀会面，一些分析人士表示，像中央军事委员会副主席、习近平的亲信张又侠这样的更高级别人物将会处于更平等的地位。 考虑到这一动荡局势，李原定于10月主持的一次国际安全会议现在备受关注。如果李在即将举行的香山论坛中没有露面，这可能意味着他仍然被拘留进行调查。外交官表示，中国计划在下个月的后半个月举行这个论坛，但尚未发出邀请，这在中国的标准下已经很晚了。香山论坛被称为北京版的香格里拉对话，是一场高级别会议，中国试图通过这个论坛塑造全球有关国防和安全问题的讨论。在上次2019年举行的香山论坛上，有超过530名国防和军事官员以及学者参加，包括来自23个国家的国防部长。中国国防部长通常会在论坛上发表主题演讲，并
The disappearance of Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu highlights the opaque and complex nature of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), diplomats and analysts say.
Reuters reported on Friday that Li is under investigation over the corrupt procurement of military equipment during his previous role. Eight other senior officials are also being investigated. His fate has not been officially explained.
In the Chinese system, the Minister of National Defence is seen as significantly less powerful than the U.S. defence secretary and many international equivalents.
The position is essentially a diplomatic and ceremonial role without a direct command function.
Even so, Li is among the six military officials under Commander-in-Chief and President Xi Jinping on the core Central Military Commission (CMC) and is one of five State Councillors, a post outranking a regular cabinet minister.
An aerospace engineer who worked in China's satellite program, Li was seen as technocrat who helped implement Xi's modernisation vision for the PLA, military attaches and analysts say.
The PLA is the armed wing of the ruling Communist Party and, according the Pentagon's annual report on China's military, "does not directly serve the state but is rather under the direct control of the party".
As Li rose through his career to this point, he would have been vetted to ensure he was absolutely loyal to the party and to Xi.
The PLA still operates an active cadre of political commissars who flank the command chain, tasked with ensuring loyalty, unity and morale. The commissar system does not have clear equivalents outside traditional Communist militaries.
The CMC, meanwhile, is the party's highest-level decision-making body on military matters.
"Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi Jinping has implemented multiple reforms reducing PLA autonomy and greatly strengthening Party control over the military," notes the Pentagon report, which was released in November 2022.
That adds an extra layer of opacity beyond routine military secrecy, according to foreign defence attaches who scrutinise the PLA.
For sure. The PLA is already the world's largest fighting force and growing more capable and modernised. As it absorbs new weapons, its system is changing too, with the creation in recent years of new unified regional commands and a Strategic Support Force to cover its space and cyber warfare capabilities - a body Li was deputy commander of in 2016.
As the PLA's power and reach expands, foreign militaries are eager to learn more about how it functions and the strategic intentions of its leadership - efforts that underpin military-to-military to diplomacy.
The disappearance of Li has raised concerns among some diplomats and analysts that Chinese military outreach is being trumped by an internal security clampdown.
U.S. defence chiefs are eager to restore routine communications with their Chinese counterparts amid regional tensions.
Li, who was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2018 over the purchase of Russian weapons, shunned formal discussions with U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in Singapore in June.
After weekend talks between White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Malta, U.S. officials said they noted "limited" signs that the communications chill could ease.
Even if China announces a new defence minister and allows them to meet Austin, some analysts say a more senior figure, such as CMC vice-chairman and close Xi ally Zhang Youxia, would be a figure on a more equal footing.
Given the upheaval, an international security conference Li was due to host in October is now being closely watched.
If Li does not appear at the upcoming Xiangshan Forum, Beijing's biggest defence diplomacy outreach event, it could mean that he is still being held for investigation.
Diplomats say China is set to hold the forum in the latter half of next month, but has not sent invitations - late by China's standards.
Billed as Beijing's version of the Shangri La Dialogue, the Xiangshan Forum is a high-level conference through which China tries to shape global discussions on defence and security issues.
When the forum was last held in-person in 2019, more than 530 defence and military officials and scholars attended, including defence ministers from 23 countries.
The Chinese defence minister would typically give the keynote speech at the forum and meet with delegations.