The Washington Post-In the shadow of US-China rivalry a new world order is emerging
September 8, 2023 6 min 1066 words
这篇报道深刻地反映了当前全球政治格局的动态。G20峰会在美中竞争的背景下举行，却因俄罗斯总统普京和中国国家主席习近平的缺席而黯然失色。然而，这并没有化解这一多元集团内部在气候变化和乌克兰战争等问题上的政治分歧。文章提到，峰会可能无法发表正式联合宣言，这将对印度总理莫迪构成打击，因为他希望这次峰会成为印度崭露头角的象征。 回顾14年前的G20峰会，当时被誉为引领“新世界秩序”的力量，有望将全球经济从大规模金融危机的泥淖中拯救出来。然而，如今的全球政治局势与当年的愿景相去甚远。俄罗斯对乌克兰的全面入侵加深了克里姆林宫与西方的鸿沟，而大流行病和气候变化则揭示了世界富有和贫穷之间的不平等。西方国家对早期全球化时代的自由贸易热情感到厌倦，越来越受制于国内曾经边缘化的民族主义运动。在西方之外，包括印度在内的许多国家的自由民主体制在面对掌握大多数权力的威权民粹主义政党时感到困难。 与此同时，美中之间的竞争也不容忽视。拜登形容习近平未出席新德里会议为“令人失望”，但美国官员预计将利用该论坛宣扬华盛顿在发展低收入和中等收入国家方面的优势。这表明美国政府正试图在中国的崛起面前巩固亚洲的潜在支点。文章中引用了新加坡前外交官Kishore Mahbubani的话，称美国正在极力争取印度，类似于上世纪70年代美国为了平衡苏联而向中国展开的争取。他认为这次峰会可能只是领导人合影的机会，而不会有实质性进展。 此外，文章提到了中国在南非举行的BRICS峰会中的出现，暗示中国可能将BRICS视为一个更有用的国际平台，这个平台不包括美国和许多西方盟友，这引发了关于G20这种机构的相关性的新问题。 总的来说，这篇报道突出了“中等大国”的增长影响如何改变我们对全球政治的看法。文章中提到的“自助式世界”意味着国家不再需要从固定的联盟菜单中选择，而可以根据自己的利益参与国际事务。这种新的全球秩序可能看起来有些混乱，但它反映了世界正在迈向一个新的秩序，超级大国不再具有足够的经济、军事或意识形态的影响力来迫使其他国家站队。在这个新世界秩序中，中等大国的影响力不断增强，他们正在积极推动自己的目标和利益，而不是向超级大国效忠。这对全球政治和经济格局都带来了新的挑战和机遇。
2023-09-06T19:02:51.250Z
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Outside India, there are subdued expectations for the leaders summit of the Group of 20 major economies, hosted in New Delhi this weekend. The absence of Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as Chinese President Xi Jinping has dimmed the geopolitical spotlight on the event; still, it has done little to smooth over the political differences within this diverse bloc over issues ranging from climate change to the war in Ukraine. As President Biden and other world leaders made their way to India, there were even suggestions that the meetings could conclude without a formal joint declaration — an outcome that would mark a blow to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose government wants the summit to be the latest sign of India’s arrival as a force on the world stage.
Fourteen years ago, the understandings forged between the powers of the West and the developing world at the G-20 helped lift the global economy out of the morass of an epic financial crisis. At the time, the bloc was hailed by then-British prime minister Gordon Brown as the vehicle of a “new world order,” one leading the way to a “new progressive era of international co-operation.”
That “progressive” era has not come about. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has deepened the chasm between the Kremlin and a galvanized geopolitical West. The toll of the pandemic and climate change keep exposing, in ways big and small, the grim inequities between the world’s haves and have-nots. The United States and other Western countries have soured on the free-trading enthusiasm of an earlier era of globalization and are increasingly beholden to once-fringe reactionary nationalist movements at home. Outside the West, liberal democracies in myriad countries, including India, are ailing in the face of entrenched, illiberal, majoritarian ruling parties.
India’s ruling Hindu nationalists push ‘Bharat’ as country’s name
Then there’s the rivalry between the United States and China. Biden described Xi’s no-show in New Delhi as “disappointing,” but U.S. officials are expected to use the forum as a way to tout how Washington, rather than China, can best help with the development of low- and middle-income nations in what’s broadly referred to as the “Global South.” For the White House, the summit is more a backdrop for a clearer geopolitical agenda — after New Delhi, Biden will go to Vietnam for a state visit, during which a slate of major cooperation deals is expected to be announced. That trip, along with the United States’ efforts to deepen ties with India, showcase how the Biden administration is trying to secure potential Asian bulwarks against China.
“The U.S. is courting India ferociously. Paradoxically, the best comparison to make of this courtship is with the ferocious courtship of China by the U.S. to counterbalance the Soviet Union in the 1970s,” said former Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani in a recent interview. “Little of substance will emerge from the summit,” he added, referring to the weekend’s meetings. “It may well prove to be, like many G-7 meetings, a photo opportunity for the leaders attending it.”
The G-20 meetings come in the wake of the recent BRICS summit in South Africa, where Xi did make an appearance. It seems Beijing may view that bloc, which does not include the United States and many top Western allies, as a more useful platform for its international agenda. BRICS appears set to expand its ranks next year, raising new questions about the relevance of an institution like the G-20, which may no longer be the principal forum for the major powers of the developing world.
“While China cannot win a battle against a U.S.-led bloc, President Xi Jinping seems convinced that it can take its place as a great power in a fragmented global order,” observed Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, arguing that the arena upon which Beijing and Washington are exercising their rivalry is altogether different from the context that surrounded the binary clash of the Cold War in the previous century.
“The picture that emerges is of a world in which the superpowers lack sufficient economic, military, or ideological clout to force the rest of the world — in particular, the increasingly confident ‘middle powers’ — to pick a side,” Leonard wrote. “From South Korea to Niger to the new BRICS members, countries can afford to advance their own goals and interests, rather than pledging fealty to the superpowers.”
With wary eye on China, U.S. moves closer to former foe Vietnam
The growing influence of the “middle powers” is changing how we think of global politics. “Welcome to the a la carte world,” wrote Alec Russell in a smart piece for the Financial Times. “As the post-cold war age of America as a sole superpower fades, the old era when countries had to choose from a prix fixe menu of alliances is shifting into a more fluid order.”
Russell pointed to countries like Kenya, which are, “with alacrity and increasing skill,” engaging a host of regional and world powers, from Washington to Beijing, London to Tehran, on their own terms: Participating in a naval exercise here, an infrastructure deal there. This week, Nairobi hosted an inaugural African summit on climate to set the continent’s “common position” ahead of U.N.-backed climate meetings later this year. Kenyan President William Ruto has been outspoken about both the West and China’s obligations to help Africa cope with a climate crisis not of its own making, as well as to redress an inequitable global lending structures that have saddled African economies with huge public debts.
“Don’t focus on U.S.-China competition, as they are not going to be able to discipline fragmentation as Russia and America did in the Cold War,” Ivan Krastev, a prominent Bulgarian political scientist, told the Finatial Times. “The middle powers may not be big enough or strong enough to shape the international order, but their ambition is to increase their relevance.”
It all may seem a bit confusing, a bit chaotic. But out of this geopolitical muddle, a new world older is lurching into motion.