纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英中国的军事力量正走向全球
September 8, 2023 6 min 1133 words
这篇报道揭示了中国军事战略的全球化趋势,强调了中国在海外建设军事基地和战略要地的举措。这一发展对华盛顿和其盟友可能带来严重影响。中国的海外扩张不仅提供了更多机会用于南海等地的军事行动,还允许其监控和影响全球重要的海上航线,如马六甲海峡。 文章指出,中国在世界各地建设基础设施的一带一路倡议为其海外军事战略提供了基础,其中商业项目被改造成军事设施。这种战略可能对美国构成挑战,因为它涉及到更多的领域,包括网络战、电子战和太空军事。 报道还强调了中国在信息战方面的努力,包括在世界各地建立情报和通信基础设施,以干扰美国和其盟友的军事和基础设施。这一战略的深刻性意味着美国政策制定者需要制定更主动的战略,以遏制中国的行动,并采取措施说服东道国政府限制中国的军事进展。 最后,文章强调了中国军事战略的全球性深度,呼吁美国政府采取更积极的方法来应对这一挑战,而不是被动地追赶。这篇评论强调了中国的军事战略走向全球对国际关系和地缘政治格局的潜在重大影响。
At Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, China is nearing completion of what U.S. officials suspect will be its first overseas military outpost in the Indo-Pacific region. This represents a major evolution in Beijing’s regional defense strategy. Beyond facilitating Chinese military adventurism in the South China Sea, the new base could provide the People’s Liberation Army, or P.L.A., with a staging ground to monitor and influence vital maritime routes like the Malacca Strait, through which an estimated 40 percent of the world’s trade flows.
But the base also shines a light on Beijing’s broader embrace of an innovative strategy to challenge American military strength that has potentially grave implications for Washington and its allies.
但是,该基地也揭示了北京更广泛地采用创新战略来挑战美国的军事实力,可能对华盛顿及其盟友产生严重影响。
China’s expanding military mission centers on establishing what it calls “strategic strong points” along China’s major trade, energy and resource routes, especially those that run from China through the Malacca Strait and into the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. China has plainly stated that these points are designed to “provide support for overseas military operations” and “exert political and military influence” abroad.
Open-source intelligence and imagery suggest that China is laying the groundwork for this network with completed or potential projects stretching from Djibouti in East Africa and Equatorial Guinea on Africa’s Atlantic coast to the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific.
China’s defense strategy has historically been focused on defending Chinese territory closer to home. But as its military strength and overseas interests have grown, Beijing has pivoted toward deploying military assets farther abroad. China remains at a great tactical disadvantage compared with the United States, which maintains a sprawling, expensive network of hundreds of military bases in more than 80 countries. But China now has the world’s largest navy. That, combined with its new approach — leaner and more cost-effective than the everywhere-at-once U.S. strategy — could chip away at America’s edge, giving Beijing the ability to strike military or other high-value targets during a conflict or neutralize America’s ability to redirect its forces to China’s immediate periphery should a conflict arise there.
In building this architecture, China is utilizing the groundwork already laid by its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative, begun a decade ago and centered on revitalizing infrastructure at ports around the world with the goal of expanding Chinese economic and political power. Once-commercial projects are now being retrofitted with military assets.
在建设这一架构的过程中,中国正在利用其庞大的“一带一路”倡议已经奠定的基础。该倡议始于10年前,以振兴世界各地港口的基础设施为中心,目标是扩大中国的经济和政治实力。曾经的商业项目现在正在改造为军事资产。
Concerned U.S. policymakers need look no farther than Djibouti — China’s first overseas “strategic strong point.” In 2015, China began work on a civilian multipurpose port in the country, located where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean. That port, near the U.S. military’s Camp Lemonnier, has evolved into a heavily fortified base. According to the intelligence platform Stratfor, it includes more than 250,000 square feet of underground bunkers — a common P.L.A. technique for concealing artillery and other munitions from spy satellites.
Similar changes are afoot at the port of Khalifa in the United Arab Emirates, where a Chinese shipping conglomerate built and now operates a commercial container terminal. Biden administration officials believe China is building a covert military facility there — around 50 miles from a U.A.E. air base that hosts a major U.S. Air Force unit. In Pakistan, Beijing recently delivered two naval frigates to safeguard a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project that includes the Chinese-invested port of Gwadar, where China is believed to be considering establishing a naval presence.
China’s strategic strong points may result in new bases that could be advanced staging areas for its armed forces or platforms for spying on foreign militaries. In other cases it may reach access agreements with host countries that allow for refueling, repair and short-term stopovers of Chinese military assets or personnel.
中国的战略要地可能会形成新的基地,这些基地可能成为其武装部队的高级集结地或监视外国军队的平台。在其他情况下,它可能与东道国达成准入协议,允许中国军事资产或人员进行加油、维修和短期停留。
But tomorrow’s wars will involve more than ships and planes. They will include heavy cyber and electronic warfare and space components as well. Beijing is positioning itself for victory on this new frontier, too.
但未来的战争将不仅仅涉及船只和飞机。它们将包括大量网络战、电子战以及太空战元素。中国政府也在为自己在这一新领域的胜利做好准备。
Nearly a decade ago, President Xi Jinping tasked the P.L.A. with establishing “a new military doctrine, institutions, equipment systems, strategies and tactics” to wage “information warfare.” China’s Strategic Support Force, or S.S.F. — a part of the military that oversees space, cyberspace, communications and psychological warfare — has been charged with putting this vision into operation. The S.S.F. now maintains a presence in four known outposts in Argentina, Pakistan, Kenya and Namibia that operate tracking and telemetry stations for China’s military space program. China also reportedly has a newly uncovered eavesdropping station in Cuba, and satellite imagery suggests it has built signals-intelligence infrastructure on reclaimed reefs in the South China Sea.
Personnel at these and potentially other locations could, according to leaked U.S. intelligence reports, conduct operations to “deny, exploit or hijack” U.S. satellites. They could also carry out cyber and cognitive warfare against American or allied infrastructure — a core component of China’s strategy for undermining American military superiority, including spreading false information onto an adversary’s airwaves to degrade its decision-making.
These “strong points” could give China the ability to distract and overextend U.S. and allied forces in different operational theaters, while using Beijing’s closer military and economic ties with other countries to pressure them to limit U.S. base access. If China were to harness this overseas framework during a conflict over Taiwan, it could create a dilemma for American decision makers, forcing them to prioritize between defending the island and responding to Chinese diversionary actions elsewhere.
这些“要地”可以使中国有能力在不同的战区分散美军和盟军的注意力,并使其过度扩张,同时利用北京与其他国家更密切的军事和经济关系向这些国家施加压力,限制美国基地的使用。如果中国在台湾冲突中利用这一海外框架,就会给美国决策者造成两难境地,迫使他们在保卫台湾和应对中国在其他地方的声东击西行动之间做出取舍。
Yet as China has rolled out this far-reaching strategy over the past several years, the U.S. government has often seemed to be playing a reactive game of Whac-a-Mole. During my time in the U.S. government, I watched as Washington waited until Chinese access agreements were finalized or nearly completed in the U.A.E., Equatorial Guinea and the Solomon Islands before dispatching high-level delegations to brief those governments about the perceived risks of hosting a Chinese military facility.
Policymakers in Washington must come to grips with the strategic depth of China’s moves and devise a strategy for pre-emptively neutralizing them, including incentives or punishments to persuade host governments to rebuff China’s military advances. A single, high-ranking official should be empowered to lead this effort.
华盛顿的政策制定者必须认清中国行动的战略深度,并制定一项先发制人的战略,包括采取激励或惩罚措施,说服东道国政府拒绝中国的军事扩张。应该授权一名高级官员领导这项工作。
For a start, U.S. policymakers should direct their attention to the tiny West African nation of Gabon. China and Gabon have developed substantial military ties in recent years. A base in Gabon or nearby Equatorial Guinea — already identified by the United States as a likely P.L.A. basing target — could enable China to project power into the Atlantic Ocean for the first time.
首先,美国的政策制定者应该把注意力转向西非小国加蓬。中国和加蓬近年来发展了实质性的军事关系。加蓬或附近赤道几内亚的基地——已经被美国确定为解放军可能的基地目标——将使中国首次能够向大西洋投送力量。
Under the radar, Beijing is making moves that could reshape the global military landscape. America must stop playing catch-up and devise a strategy for staying ahead of the game.
北京正在暗中采取可能重塑全球军事格局的行动。美国一定不能再被动追赶,要制定保持领先地位的战略。