纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英中国的军事力量正走向全球

At Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, China is nearing completion of what U.S. officials suspect will be its first overseas military outpost in the Indo-Pacific region. This represents a major evolution in Beijing’s regional defense strategy. Beyond facilitating Chinese military adventurism in the South China Sea, the new base could provide the People’s Liberation Army, or P.L.A., with a staging ground to monitor and influence vital maritime routes like the Malacca Strait, through which an estimated 40 percent of the world’s trade flows.

在柬埔寨的云壤海军基地，美国官员猜测的中国在印太地区的首个海外军事前哨基地即将建成。这代表着北京的地区防务战略发生了重大演变。除了为中国在南海的军事冒险提供便利外，新基地还可以为中国人民解放军提供一个集结地，监控和影响马六甲海峡等重要海上航线，据估计，世界上40%的贸易都要经过马六甲海峡。

But the base also shines a light on Beijing’s broader embrace of an innovative strategy to challenge American military strength that has potentially grave implications for Washington and its allies.

但是，该基地也揭示了北京更广泛地采用创新战略来挑战美国的军事实力，可能对华盛顿及其盟友产生严重影响。

China’s expanding military mission centers on establishing what it calls “strategic strong points” along China’s major trade, energy and resource routes, especially those that run from China through the Malacca Strait and into the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. China has plainly stated that these points are designed to “provide support for overseas military operations” and “exert political and military influence” abroad.

中国不断扩大的军事任务集中在沿中国主要贸易、能源和资源路线建立所谓的“战略要地”，特别是那些从中国穿过马六甲海峡进入印度洋和亚丁湾的路线。中国明确表示，这些要地旨在“为海外军事行动提供支持”，并在海外“施加政治和军事影响”。

Open-source intelligence and imagery suggest that China is laying the groundwork for this network with completed or potential projects stretching from Djibouti in East Africa and Equatorial Guinea on Africa’s Atlantic coast to the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific.

公开来源的情报和图像显示，中国正在为这一网络奠定基础，从东非的吉布提、非洲大西洋沿岸的赤道几内亚到南太平洋的所罗门群岛，都有中国已完成或可能进行的项目。

China’s defense strategy has historically been focused on defending Chinese territory closer to home. But as its military strength and overseas interests have grown, Beijing has pivoted toward deploying military assets farther abroad. China remains at a great tactical disadvantage compared with the United States, which maintains a sprawling, expensive network of hundreds of military bases in more than 80 countries. But China now has the world’s largest navy. That, combined with its new approach — leaner and more cost-effective than the everywhere-at-once U.S. strategy — could chip away at America’s edge, giving Beijing the ability to strike military or other high-value targets during a conflict or neutralize America’s ability to redirect its forces to China’s immediate periphery should a conflict arise there.

中国的国防战略历来侧重于保卫本土附近的领地。但随着军事实力和海外利益的增长，北京已转向将军事资产部署到更远的海外。与美国相比，中国在战术上仍处于非常不利的地位。美国在80多个国家拥有数百个军事基地，这是一个庞大而昂贵的网络。但中国现在拥有世界上最大的海军。再加上它的新战略——比美国的“无处不在”战略更精简、更划算——可能会削弱美国的优势，使北京有能力在冲突中打击军事或其他高价值目标，或者中国周边地区发生冲突时，削弱美国将其军队转向中国周边地区的能力。

In building this architecture, China is utilizing the groundwork already laid by its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative, begun a decade ago and centered on revitalizing infrastructure at ports around the world with the goal of expanding Chinese economic and political power. Once-commercial projects are now being retrofitted with military assets.

在建设这一架构的过程中，中国正在利用其庞大的“一带一路”倡议已经奠定的基础。该倡议始于10年前，以振兴世界各地港口的基础设施为中心，目标是扩大中国的经济和政治实力。曾经的商业项目现在正在改造为军事资产。

Concerned U.S. policymakers need look no farther than Djibouti — China’s first overseas “strategic strong point.” In 2015, China began work on a civilian multipurpose port in the country, located where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean. That port, near the U.S. military’s Camp Lemonnier, has evolved into a heavily fortified base. According to the intelligence platform Stratfor, it includes more than 250,000 square feet of underground bunkers — a common P.L.A. technique for concealing artillery and other munitions from spy satellites.

忧心忡忡的美国决策者只需看看吉布提——中国的第一个海外“战略据点”。2015年，中国开始在该国建设一个民用多用途港口，位于红海与印度洋的交汇处。这个港口靠近美军的莱蒙尼尔营，已经发展成为一个戒备森严的基地。根据情报平台Stratfor的说法，它包括超过2.3公顷的地下掩体——这是解放军用来隐藏火炮和其他弹药而不被间谍卫星发现的常用技术。

Similar changes are afoot at the port of Khalifa in the United Arab Emirates, where a Chinese shipping conglomerate built and now operates a commercial container terminal. Biden administration officials believe China is building a covert military facility there — around 50 miles from a U.A.E. air base that hosts a major U.S. Air Force unit. In Pakistan, Beijing recently delivered two naval frigates to safeguard a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project that includes the Chinese-invested port of Gwadar, where China is believed to be considering establishing a naval presence.

类似的变化也在阿拉伯联合酋长国的哈利法港上演，一家中国航运集团在这里建造并经营一个商业集装箱码头。拜登政府官员认为，中国正在那里建造一个秘密军事设施，距离美国空军一个重要部队驻扎的阿联酋空军基地约80英里。在巴基斯坦，北京最近交付了两艘海军护卫舰，以保护一个价值数十亿美元的基础设施项目，其中包括中国投资的瓜达尔港，据信中国正在考虑在那里建立海军存在。

China’s strategic strong points may result in new bases that could be advanced staging areas for its armed forces or platforms for spying on foreign militaries. In other cases it may reach access agreements with host countries that allow for refueling, repair and short-term stopovers of Chinese military assets or personnel.

中国的战略要地可能会形成新的基地，这些基地可能成为其武装部队的高级集结地或监视外国军队的平台。在其他情况下，它可能与东道国达成准入协议，允许中国军事资产或人员进行加油、维修和短期停留。

But tomorrow’s wars will involve more than ships and planes. They will include heavy cyber and electronic warfare and space components as well. Beijing is positioning itself for victory on this new frontier, too.

但未来的战争将不仅仅涉及船只和飞机。它们将包括大量网络战、电子战以及太空战元素。中国政府也在为自己在这一新领域的胜利做好准备。

Nearly a decade ago, President Xi Jinping tasked the P.L.A. with establishing “a new military doctrine, institutions, equipment systems, strategies and tactics” to wage “information warfare.” China’s Strategic Support Force, or S.S.F. — a part of the military that oversees space, cyberspace, communications and psychological warfare — has been charged with putting this vision into operation. The S.S.F. now maintains a presence in four known outposts in Argentina, Pakistan, Kenya and Namibia that operate tracking and telemetry stations for China’s military space program. China also reportedly has a newly uncovered eavesdropping station in Cuba, and satellite imagery suggests it has built signals-intelligence infrastructure on reclaimed reefs in the South China Sea.

大约十年前，习近平主席要求解放军建立“新的军事理论、制度、装备系统、战略和战术”，以开展“信息战”。中国的战略支援部队是解放军主管太空、网络空间、通信和心理战的部门，负责将这一愿景付诸实施。该部队目前在阿根廷、巴基斯坦、肯尼亚和纳米比亚的四个已知的前哨基地保持着存在，这些基地为中国的军事太空计划运营跟踪和遥测站。据报道，新近发现了中国在古巴设立了一个窃听站，卫星图像显示，中国在南海填海造岛的岛礁上建立了信号情报基础设施。

Personnel at these and potentially other locations could, according to leaked U.S. intelligence reports, conduct operations to “deny, exploit or hijack” U.S. satellites. They could also carry out cyber and cognitive warfare against American or allied infrastructure — a core component of China’s strategy for undermining American military superiority, including spreading false information onto an adversary’s airwaves to degrade its decision-making.

根据泄露的美国情报报告，这些地点和其他潜在地点的人员可能会进行“拒绝、利用或劫持”美国卫星的行动。他们还可以对美国或盟国的基础设施进行网络和认知战——这是中国削弱美国军事优势战略的核心组成部分，包括在对手的电波中传播虚假信息，以削弱其决策能力。

These “strong points” could give China the ability to distract and overextend U.S. and allied forces in different operational theaters, while using Beijing’s closer military and economic ties with other countries to pressure them to limit U.S. base access. If China were to harness this overseas framework during a conflict over Taiwan, it could create a dilemma for American decision makers, forcing them to prioritize between defending the island and responding to Chinese diversionary actions elsewhere.

这些“要地”可以使中国有能力在不同的战区分散美军和盟军的注意力，并使其过度扩张，同时利用北京与其他国家更密切的军事和经济关系向这些国家施加压力，限制美国基地的使用。如果中国在台湾冲突中利用这一海外框架，就会给美国决策者造成两难境地，迫使他们在保卫台湾和应对中国在其他地方的声东击西行动之间做出取舍。

Yet as China has rolled out this far-reaching strategy over the past several years, the U.S. government has often seemed to be playing a reactive game of Whac-a-Mole. During my time in the U.S. government, I watched as Washington waited until Chinese access agreements were finalized or nearly completed in the U.A.E., Equatorial Guinea and the Solomon Islands before dispatching high-level delegations to brief those governments about the perceived risks of hosting a Chinese military facility.

然而，随着中国在过去几年里推出这一影响深远的战略，美国政府似乎经常在玩被动的“打地鼠”游戏。在供职于美国政府期间，我看到华盛顿一直等到中国在阿联酋、赤道几内亚和所罗门群岛的准入协议最终敲定或接近完成，然后才派遣高级代表团向这些政府介绍中国军事设施的潜在风险。

Policymakers in Washington must come to grips with the strategic depth of China’s moves and devise a strategy for pre-emptively neutralizing them, including incentives or punishments to persuade host governments to rebuff China’s military advances. A single, high-ranking official should be empowered to lead this effort.

华盛顿的政策制定者必须认清中国行动的战略深度，并制定一项先发制人的战略，包括采取激励或惩罚措施，说服东道国政府拒绝中国的军事扩张。应该授权一名高级官员领导这项工作。

For a start, U.S. policymakers should direct their attention to the tiny West African nation of Gabon. China and Gabon have developed substantial military ties in recent years. A base in Gabon or nearby Equatorial Guinea — already identified by the United States as a likely P.L.A. basing target — could enable China to project power into the Atlantic Ocean for the first time.

首先，美国的政策制定者应该把注意力转向西非小国加蓬。中国和加蓬近年来发展了实质性的军事关系。加蓬或附近赤道几内亚的基地——已经被美国确定为解放军可能的基地目标——将使中国首次能够向大西洋投送力量。

Under the radar, Beijing is making moves that could reshape the global military landscape. America must stop playing catch-up and devise a strategy for staying ahead of the game.

北京正在暗中采取可能重塑全球军事格局的行动。美国一定不能再被动追赶，要制定保持领先地位的战略。