「中英」中国和伊朗等威权政府利用美国私家侦探监视在美异见人士

The job that came in through Michael McKeever’s website was unremarkable, the kind of request he often received in his decades working as a private investigator in New York.

迈克尔·麦基弗通过自己的网站接到的这份工作并不特别，他在纽约做私人侦探的几十年里经常收到这样的要求。

An international client wanted his help tracking down a debtor who had fled from Dubai and was believed to be in Brooklyn. Mr. McKeever was to surveil a house and photograph the people coming and going. “Kindly be discreet as they are on the lookout,” he was told.

一个国际客户想让他帮忙追踪一个从迪拜逃出来的债务人，据信他现在在布鲁克林。麦基弗要监视一所房子，给进出的人拍照。他被告知：“他们非常小心，请谨慎行事。”

Mr. McKeever and an associate began taking turns conducting the surveillance, but they failed to notice another team watching the same address. They were F.B.I. agents, and one soon got in touch with a warning.

麦基弗和一名助手开始轮流进行监视，但他们没有注意到另一队人也在监视同一个地址。这些人是联邦调查局探员，其中一人很快就联系了他们，并且发出了警告。

“Your client is not who you think they are,” the agent said, according to Mr. McKeever. “These are bad people, and they’re up to no good.”

“你的客户不是你想的那样，”麦基弗说那名探员告诉他。“他们都是坏人，他们不怀好意。”

Mr. McKeever, 71, would later learn that he had been used by Iranian intelligence agents in a suspected plot to kidnap Masih Alinejad, a prominent Iranian-American journalist who has been unsparing in her criticism of Iran’s human rights abuses, discrimination against women and imprisonment and torture of political opponents.

现年71岁的麦基弗后来得知，他被伊朗情报人员利用，参与了涉嫌绑架马西赫·阿林尼内贾德的计划。阿林尼内贾德是一位著名的伊朗裔美国记者，毫不留情地批评了伊朗侵犯人权、歧视妇女，以及监禁和折磨政治对手的行为。

“We were afraid they were going to look to snatch and grab her, bring her home and probably kill her,” said James E. Dennehy, the former head of the F.B.I.’s counterintelligence and cyber division in New York, who now runs the bureau’s Newark office.

“我们担心他们会抓住她，把她带回国，可能还会杀了她，”联邦调查局驻纽约反间谍和网络部门的前负责人詹姆斯·丹内希说，他现在负责联邦调查局在纽瓦克的办公室。

Across America, investigators are increasingly being hired by a new kind of client — authoritarian governments like Iran and China attempting to surveil, harass, threaten and even repatriate dissidents living lawfully in the United States, law enforcement officials said.

执法官员说，在美国各地，越来越多的调查人员受雇于一种新的客户——伊朗和中国等威权政府，他们试图监视、骚扰、威胁甚至遣返合法居住在美国的异见人士。

Federal indictments and complaints in the past two years detail cases in which private investigators were drawn into such schemes in New York, California and Indiana, and F.B.I. officials say they believe others have been as well. Most appear to have been used unwittingly, and later cooperated with the authorities; a few, however, were charged.

过去两年的联邦起诉书和投诉详细描述了纽约、加州和印第安纳州的私人侦探被卷入此类阴谋的案件。联邦调查局官员表示，他们认为还有一些人也卷入了此类阴谋。大多数似乎是在不知情的情况下被利用，后来与当局合作；然而，也有一些人遭到起诉。

Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, said a government can hire an investigator in a routine transaction to learn detailed information about a person’s residence, cellphones, Social Security number, work address — and feed that knowledge to a state security apparatus.

美国外交关系委员会研究恐怖主义问题的学者布鲁斯·霍夫曼说，一个政府可以通过常规途径雇佣调查员，了解一个人的住所、手机、社保号码和工作地址的详细信息，并将这些信息提供给国家安全机构。

“It strikes me as low-cost, low-risk state-sponsored terrorism in the 21st century,” Mr. Hoffman said.

“在我看来，这是21世纪低成本、低风险的国家支持恐怖主义，”霍夫曼说。

The tactic comes amid a broad wave of repression, officials said, which has included the poisonings of opponents of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Britain and elsewhere; Saudi Arabia’s involvement in luring Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent critic, to its Istanbul consulate where he was brutally killed and dismembered in 2018; and Turkey’s pursuit of perceived enemies in at least 31 countries, according to a 2021 report by Freedom House, which promotes democracy globally.

官员们表示，这一策略是在一波广泛的镇压浪潮中出现的，其他行为包括在英国等地对俄罗斯总统普京的反对者下毒；2018年沙特阿拉伯诱骗著名批评者贾马尔·哈苏吉前往该国驻伊斯坦布尔领事馆，在那里将其残忍杀害和肢解；以及根据全球促进民主的自由之家2021年的报告所称，土耳其在至少31个国家追捕其认定的敌人。

In the case involving Ms. Alinejad, Manhattan federal prosecutors filed kidnapping conspiracy charges in July 2021 against an Iranian intelligence official and three associates, all in Iran. None are likely to be apprehended if they remain there, but officials said the goal, beyond protecting potential victims, was to expose and deter plots devised at the highest levels of a foreign government.

在涉及阿林尼内贾德的案件中，曼哈顿联邦检察官于2021年7月对一名伊朗情报官员和三名同伙提出绑架阴谋指控，他们都在伊朗。如果他们继续留在该国，就不太可能被逮捕，但官员们表示，除了保护潜在受害者之外，他们的目标是揭露和阻止外国政府最高层策划的阴谋。

For most private eyes, daily work is far from the glamorized depictions in film and literature, with jobs originating with law firms, insurance companies and aggrieved spouses. Today, many assignments come via the internet, with no face-to-face contact.

大多数私人侦探的日常工作与电影和文学作品中被美化的描述相距甚远，在那些描述中，他们的工作来自律师事务所、保险公司和受害的配偶。如今，许多任务都是通过互联网接到，没有面对面的接触。

“If you’ve got somebody on the other side — an intelligence professional who can lie and create smoke and mirrors — sometimes it’s hard to vet those clients correctly,” said Wes Bearden, a Dallas-based private investigator and an officer of the World Association of Detectives, which has about 1,000 members.

“如果另一边有这样一个人——一个会撒谎、会制造烟雾和假象的情报专业人员——有时很难正确审查这些客户，”达拉斯私人侦探、世界侦探协会官员韦斯·比尔登说，该协会有大约1000名成员。

Many private investigators, some with backgrounds in law enforcement, are decidedly old school. Mr. McKeever’s website bears the motto “Delivering the truth … with honesty and proof,” and lists offerings like employment background checks and “Infidelity & Matrimonial Investigation.”

许多私家侦探——其中一些有供职于执法部门的背景——有明显的老派作风。麦基弗的网站上写有“通过诚实和证据传递真相”的格言，列出了诸如就业背景调查和“不忠与婚姻调查”等服务项目。

That sort of street-level legwork can also provide the basis of an intelligence operation, one that foreign governments can conduct cheaply at a safe remove.

这种街头巷尾的跑腿工作也可以为情报行动提供基础，外国政府可以躲在暗处以低廉的成本进行这种行动。

“That’s their proxy that they use here on the ground in a very natural way to do a lot of their dirty work,” the F.B.I.’s Mr. Dennehy said.

“这是他们使用的代理，他们以一种非常自然的方式在这里做很多肮脏的工作，”联邦调查局的丹内希说。

In Ms. Alinejad’s case, he said, the Iranians wanted to know her emotions, her state of mind — even her body language. Was she frantically looking over her shoulder or did she seem carefree?

他说，在阿林尼内贾德一案中，伊朗人想知道她的情绪，她的精神状态，甚至她的肢体语言。她是否总在慌张地回头张望，还是看上去无忧无虑？

Mr. McKeever said that after being told of Iran’s role, he secretly cooperated with the bureau, providing access to his email account. F.B.I. officials confirmed his cooperation. Mr. McKeever has not been accused of any wrongdoing, and he continues to operate his firm.

麦基弗说，得知伊朗在其中扮演的角色后，他秘密与联邦调查局合作，提供了进入自己电子邮件账户的权限。联邦调查局官员证实了他的合作。麦基弗没有被指控有任何不当行为，继续经营着自己的公司。

As private investigators fall victim to the sorts of schemes they usually unearth, the F.B.I. says it has been contacting professional groups to warn them.

随着陆续有私人侦探落入这种他们经常发现的陷阱，联邦调查局表示一直在联系专业团体，提醒他们注意。

“The more we can draw attention to it, the more we hope private investigators and others will learn to spot these red flags,” said Roman Rozhavsky, an F.B.I. counterintelligence official in New York.

“我们越能引起人们的注意，私家侦探和其他人就越有机会学会发现这些危险信号，”联邦调查局驻纽约反间谍官员罗曼·罗扎夫斯基说。

Not every private eye has avoided legal trouble. Michael McMahon, a 55-year-old retired New York Police Department sergeant who built a second career as a private investigator, was arrested in 2020. He faces charges of acting as an illegal agent for the Chinese government, stalking and two conspiracy counts. Prosecutors say he was part of an effort to coerce a Chinese citizen living in New Jersey, identified only as John Doe-1, to return to that country.

并非所有私人侦探都能避免法律纠纷。55岁的纽约警察局退休警官迈克尔·麦克马洪的第二职业是私家侦探，他于2020年被捕。他面临的指控包括为中国政府充当非法代理人、跟踪和两项阴谋指控。检察官表示，他参与了一项强迫一名居住在新泽西的中国公民返回中国的行动，该公民只被确认为无名氏一。

Mr. McMahon said that he was stunned and that he had no knowledge he was working for China.

麦克马洪说，他很震惊，他不知道自己在为中国工作。

“When I read the complaint against me,” he said in an email, “I became sick to my stomach. As my background shows, I committed my life to upholding the law and never have — and never would — commit a crime.”

“当我读到针对我的起诉时，”他在电子邮件中写道，“我感到很不舒服。正如我的背景所显示的，我毕生致力于维护法律，从来没有，也永远不会犯罪。”

Mr. McMahon said in an interview that in 2016, he took a job from a woman who found him through his website. He said he was led to believe she was calling for a client from China who was seeking a person in New Jersey who had stolen money from a Chinese construction company.

麦克马洪在一次采访中说，2016年，他从一个通过他的网站找到他的女人那里接到了一份工作。他说，他被误导，以为她是代表一个来自中国的客户，这个客户正在寻找一个现居新泽西州的人，他偷了一家中国建筑公司的钱。

“We need to locate that person — is that something you do?” he recalled her asking.

“我们需要找到那个人——这是你的业务范围吗？”他记得她这样问。

“‘I said, ‘Yeah, that’s what I do.’”

“我说，‘对，我就是干这个的。’”

Mr. McMahon said the woman claimed to own a translation company and paid him with a check in the firm’s name. He said he conducted surveillance on five occasions in New Jersey in 2016 and 2017, each time notifying local police departments that he was parked outside a residence. That, Mr. McMahon said, was evidence that he had nothing to hide. He said he hired two other investigators, both retired New York police detectives, to help.

麦克马洪说，这名女子声称自己拥有一家翻译公司，并以该公司的名义给了他一张支票。他说，2016年和2017年，他在新泽西进行了五次监视，每次都通知了当地警方，他把车停在了一处住宅外。麦克马洪说，这证明他没什么好隐瞒的。他说，他还雇佣了另外两名调查人员来帮忙，他们都是纽约的退休警探。

Mr. McMahon said he was awakened early one morning in October 2020 by his dog barking and someone banging on the door of his Bergen County, N.J., house. About a dozen F.B.I. agents and police officers had come to arrest him.

麦克马洪说，2020年10月的一个清晨，他在位于新泽西州卑尔根县的家中被他的狗和敲门声吵醒，有十几名联邦调查局特工和警察前来逮捕他。

Justice Department officials said Mr. McMahon and a group of other defendants, some in China, were part of an aggressive Chinese government campaign called Operation Fox Hunt. Brooklyn federal prosecutors have said Mr. McMahon was integral to the scheme.

司法部官员说，麦克马洪和其他一些被告（其中一些在中国）参与了中国政府的一项名为“猎狐行动”的强势行动 。布鲁克林联邦检察官表示，麦克马洪是该计划不可或缺的一部分。

“After multiple months of investigative work by the defendant Michael McMahon,” the indictment says, “the co-conspirators planned a specific rendition operation to stalk and repatriate John Doe-1 through psychological coercion.”

“在被告迈克尔·麦克马洪进行了几个月的调查工作后，”起诉书称，“同谋者计划了一项具体的引渡行动，通过心理胁迫跟踪并遣返无名氏一。”

Prosecutors have said Mr. McMahon knew John Doe-1 was being sought by the Chinese government: While conducting surveillance, he emailed himself a link to an English-language Chinese newspaper page listing the man among 100 fugitives wanted in an anti-graft campaign.

检方表示，麦克马洪知道无名氏一受中国政府追捕：他曾在进行监视时，用电子邮件给自己发了一个中国的英文报纸页面链接，上面列有100名在一场反腐运动中被通缉的逃犯，其中包括无名氏一。

They have also said that Mr. McMahon, in a conversation with a co-defendant, a Chinese citizen who had lived in Queens, proposed they harass John Doe-1 by parking outside his house to “let him know we are there.”

检方还说，麦克马洪在与一名共同被告（此人是中国公民，曾住在皇后区）谈话时曾提议把车停在无名氏一的房子外面，对其实施骚扰，“让他知道我们在那里。”

Mr. McMahon’s lawyer, Lawrence S. Lustberg, said that investigators are often hired by private firms to locate people who are simultaneously sought by the authorities, and that his client’s harassment comment was just a suggestion that they engage in more overt surveillance — which he said never occurred.

麦克马洪的律师劳伦斯·卢斯特伯格说，私人公司经常雇调查员，寻找同时也被当局追捕的人，他的当事人有关骚扰的说法只是建议他们进行更公开的监视，但他说，这从未发生。

“I have not seen one piece of evidence — not one — that Mike had any idea that he was in any way working for the Chinese government,” Mr. Lustberg said.

“我没有看到一份证据，表明迈克知道自己以任何形式为中国政府工作，一份都没有，”卢斯特伯格说。

The U.S. attorney’s office in Brooklyn declined to comment.

布鲁克林的联邦检察官办公室拒绝置评。

Mr. Lustberg noted that his client also was not given an opportunity to cooperate with investigators.

卢斯特伯格指出，他的当事人也没有得到与调查人员合作的机会。

“There never comes a time before his arrest,” Mr. Lustberg said, “where the federal government goes to him and says, ‘Hey, do you realize what’s going on here? You are being played by the Chinese government.’”

“在他被捕之前，联邦政府从来没有对他说过，‘嘿，你知道这里的情况吗？你正在被中国政府利用，’”卢斯特伯格说。

Iran, a theocracy facing a cresting wave of protest at home, has also been eyeing its critics abroad for years and has taken advantage of American detectives. In July 2020, Mr. McKeever received the email asking that he watch the Brooklyn home that turned out to be Ms. Alinejad’s residence.

伊朗是一个在国内面临激烈抗议浪潮的神权国家，多年来也一直盯着国外的批评者，并且利用美国的侦探。2020年7月，麦基弗收到一封电子邮件，要求他注意布鲁克林的那栋房子，他后来得知那栋房子是阿林尼内贾德的住所。

“I am contacting you on behalf of a client looking [for] a missing person from Dubai, U.A.E., who has fled to avoid debt repayment,” wrote the sender, Kiya Sadeghi, according to the indictment.

据起诉书，发件人基亚·萨迪吉写道：“我代表一位客户与您联系，寻找一名来自阿联酋迪拜的失踪人员，该人为躲避债务而逃离。”

Ms. Alinejad, as a journalist in Iran, had frequently exposed malfeasance and corruption, and was threatened with arrest or worse for writing articles critical of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Her press pass was revoked and she was forced to flee in 2009. From Brooklyn, she has remained a high-profile presence in the news media. In July, a man was arrested with a loaded AK-47-style assault rifle outside her home.

阿林尼内贾德在伊朗当记者时，曾经常对渎职和腐败进行曝光，并因撰写批评前总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪内贾德的文章而受到逮捕或更糟的威胁。2009年，她的记者证被吊销，被迫逃离伊朗。在住地布鲁克林，她一直在新闻媒体上高调露面。今年7月，一名携带着上膛AK-47突击步枪的男子在她家门外被逮捕。

Mr. McKeever said he knew nothing about Ms. Alinejad. Mr. Sadeghi’s email said his services were needed for surveillance on a “potential address” for the missing person, according to the indictment.

麦基弗说，他对阿林尼内贾德一无所知。据起诉书的说法，萨迪吉在邮件中写道，需要麦基弗在一个“潜在地址”监视该失踪人员的服务。

“Will need high quality pictures/video of persons living in the address and cars they drive,” one email said. The client wanted “photos of faces and cars” and their license plate numbers and, “if possible picture of envelopes in mailbox,” Mr. Sadeghi wrote in another message.

“我们需要记录该地址居住者和所驾驶车辆的高质量图片/视频，”一封邮件写道。萨迪吉在另一封邮件中写道，客户想得到“人脸和汽车的照片”以及车牌号，“如果有可能的话，还希望得到邮箱中的信封照片。”

To Mr. McKeever, the assignment seemed straightforward: “I thought it might be a one-day job.”

对麦基弗来说，这份差事似乎一点也不复杂：“我原以为一天就能干完。”

The indictment identifies Mr. Sadeghi as an Iranian intelligence agent who researched and hired investigators in the United States, Canada and Britain to procure surveillance services for Iranian intelligence, the indictment said.

起诉书指出，萨迪吉是伊朗情报人员，他曾在美国、加拿大和英国对侦探进行研究，并雇佣他们为伊朗情报机构获取监视服务。

On July 22, 2020, Mr. McKeever emailed Mr. Sadeghi to report that surveillance had begun, and attached a photograph of the home.

2020年7月22日，麦基弗给萨迪吉发了一封电子邮件，汇报监视工作已经开始，并附上了一张该住宅的照片。

In August and September, he was asked for additional days of work, including pictures and video. The client also wanted “pictures of faces of everyone visiting the address, even if they are marketers and salespeople,” one email said.

同年8月和9月，麦基弗收到再多工作几天的要求，包括提供照片和视频。一封电子邮件写道，该客户还想得到“每个访问该地址的人脸照片，即使只是营销人员和销售人员。”

“Pictures of everything and everyone,” Mr. Sadeghi wrote in another message. “Client wants lots of content even if you may think it is not of value.”

“所有人和事的照片，”萨迪吉在另一封邮件中写道。“客户想得到大量的内容，即使是你或许认为没有价值的内容。”

In October 2020, Mr. McKeever received the call from the F.B.I. He agreed to cooperate.

2020年10月，麦基弗接到了联邦调查局打来的电话。他同意合作。

“I was like, hey, whatever you need, I’m good,” Mr. McKeever said.

“我当时的反应是，嘿，不管你需要什么，我都配合，”麦基弗说。

Mr. McKeever said he continued to communicate with Mr. Sadeghi with full knowledge of the F.B.I., and conducted additional surveillance in early 2021. At one point, Mr. Sadeghi asked whether it was possible to park in front of the house in a car outfitted with a camera to provide a live video feed. In all, Mr. McKeever was paid just under $6,000 for his services, the indictment says.

麦基弗说，他在联邦调查局完全知道的情况下继续与萨迪吉联系，并在2021年初进行了更多监视工作。又一次，萨迪吉曾问是否能把一辆配有摄像头的汽车停在那栋房子前面，提供实时视频。起诉书说，麦基弗的这些服务总共得到了不到6000美元的报酬。

Looking back, he does not believe he ignored obvious red flags in the repeated requests from Mr. Sadeghi. But he acknowledged that he missed clues that might have raised suspicions, like the questions he had posed to Mr. Sadeghi that never generated satisfactory answers.

回过头来看，麦基弗不认为自己忽视了萨迪吉一再要求中的明显危险信号。但他承认，他错过了一些可能引起怀疑的线索，比如，他向萨迪吉提出的问题从未得到过满意的回答。

For example, he said he asked for the name of the supposed debtor, so he could determine whether a person by that name lived at the Brooklyn address. He was never told. He now believes the Iranians were trying to thwart any checking he might have done on his own.

例如他说，他问了所谓的逃债人的姓名，以便确定用这个名字的人是否住在布鲁克林的那个地址。他一直没有得到答复。他现在认为，伊朗人曾试图阻挠他可能独自进行的任何核实。

“One of the things I could have done is run a trace on that house and said, ‘Who lives here?’” Mr. McKeever recalled. “And I could have Googled that woman’s name.” If he had learned her name, he said, his reaction would have been, “‘Whoa, wait a second.’”

“我本可以做的一件事是，对那栋房子进行追踪，找到‘谁住在这里？’”麦基弗回忆说。“然后，我就可以谷歌一下那个女人的名字。”他说，如果他知道了她的名字，他的反应会是，“哇，等一下。”

Ms. Alinejad, in an interview, said she was furious when she learned of the extent of the surveillance.

阿林尼内贾德在接受采访时说，她了解到监控程度之深后非常愤怒。

“Miles away from my homeland,” Ms. Alinejad said, “I’m being watched and monitored by someone who has been hired by the Iranian regime.”

“我在远离家乡的地方被伊朗政权雇人监视，”阿林尼内贾德说。

According to the indictment, the plotters had researched routes from Ms. Alinejad’s home to the Brooklyn waterfront, and methods of taking her by boat to Venezuela and on to Iran.

据起诉书的说法，秘密策划者研究了从阿林尼内贾德的住所到布鲁克林海滨的路线，以及用船将她带到委内瑞拉再送回伊朗的方法。

“No question in my mind that they could have done it,” Mr. McKeever said, adding, “I’m glad that it didn’t work out.”

“毫无疑问，他们完全有可能干成这件事，”麦基弗说。他还说，“我很高兴他们没能成功。”

Over his many years as a private eye, Mr. McKeever said, he always tried to be vigilant in scrutinizing the jobs he took. He did not believe he was naïve, but he knew clients could lie. If there was a lesson for private investigators, he said, it was to be careful not to be used.

麦基弗说，在他多年的私人侦探生涯中，他总是努力保持警惕，对自己接手的差事认真核查。他不认为自己缺乏经验，但他知道客户会撒谎。他说，如果说这件事给了私人侦探一个教训的话，那就是，当心不要遭人利用。

“I was used,” he said.

“我就被利用了，”他说。