There is more to come from the China-Russia partnership

https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3199524/there-more-come-china-russia-partnership?utm_source=rss_feed

As a term describing relations between China and Russia, the “DragonBear” first emerged not as a strategic alliance or defence pact, but as an asymmetric temporary partnership that helps both countries navigate the muddy transitory waters of global affairs. The main calculus was to coordinate actions aimed at stabilising the two authoritarian regimes internally.

Moreover, Beijing and Moscow saw this coordination as a way of creating a credible anti-American narrative and counterweight in relations with third countries and regions.

Now, a closer look at Sino-Russian relations and their impact on global affairs is needed in light of Ukraine’s latest successful counteroffensive, which led to the recapture of the regional capital of Kherson.

China has been closely monitoring Russia’s war on Ukraine, and has constantly offered diplomatic and political support to Moscow. Soon after President Xi Jinping consolidated his power at the 20th Communist Party congress, China reiterated that bilateral relations were “rock solid”.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch an all-out war against Ukraine is linked to the bifurcation of the global system. When Putin and Xi signed a declaration of friendship “with no limits” on February 4, it marked the culmination of gradual Sino-Russian coordination in various strategic areas.

This modus vivendi provided Putin with the necessary international momentum to wage all-out war against Ukraine, which he had been waiting for since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, China intervened to stabilise Russia’s currency and economy. Had Putin not been certain of China’s continued support, he would not have launched an invasion in 2022.

Russia’s actions on February 24 unveiled a three-pronged strategy. The first was a kinetic war against Ukraine, threatening the country’s existence as a sovereign state.

The second was a non-kinetic war against the European security order using export blockades, migration flows, information warfare, and nuclear blackmail.

Thirdly, Russia calculated that its actions would intensify competition between the United States and China.

Russia has become subject to stringent and long-term Western sanctions, and China is key to circumventing them. After Russia’s nearly nine-month war against Ukraine, most experts are convinced that Russia has become a “vassal state” of China, as Beijing is one of a few major international players offering Moscow a considerable lifeline.

China is expected to be tougher on Russia in the event of further military setbacks in Ukraine. Xi expressed some concerns during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in Samarkand in September. He may fear reputational and geoeconomic damage at a time when Beijing is trying to boost its own economy.

Nevertheless, China is aware that Russia is keeping America and Europe busy in the old continent rather than focused on competition in the Indo-Pacific. In this regard, Beijing and Moscow should not be viewed by the US and EU as separate threats; instead, their systemic coordination must be considered a complicated “threat multiplier”.

There are several significant avenues for coordination between China and Russia that could ultimately challenge the West and impact the international security order.

Defeat in the war with Ukraine could eventually lead to Putin being ousted from the Kremlin, which would weaken the “DragonBear” by forcing China to fill a major geopolitical gap along its shared border with Russia.

In such a scenario, Beijing may try to avoid a situation in which it would face three fronts (Taiwan and the South China Sea, military tensions with India, and a security vacuum caused by Russia’s collapse), so it may largely support the Russian leadership no matter who took charge next. At the same time, Beijing may show more willingness to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction to avoid isolation by the West.

Conversely, Russia could completely reshape the European security architecture if it succeeds in Ukraine, while diverting the West’s attention from China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific region and Eurasia.

In that case, the West would be forced to deal with two fronts: a more assertive China in the Indo-Pacific, and a new European bloc made of Russia, Belarus, and the illegally occupied parts of Ukraine.

This would be by far the worst-case scenario from the perspective of the United States and Europe.

Nuclear proliferation is another key factor over which the “DragonBear” modus vivendi could harm European and American interests.

Russia’s nuclear blackmail in the war against Ukraine has significantly increased the risk of nuclear weapons being used, and China continues to disseminate Russian claims about a Nato expansion rather than withhold support from Moscow. However, China has made it very clear that it considers the use of nuclear weapons a red line.

The conduct of bilateral and multilateral military exercises between Moscow and Beijing is another avenue by which the “DragonBear” could pose new challenges for the West. They allow the two nations to manage interoperability and exchange intelligence information on security and defence. In this sense, the West would be dealing with a wide geographic scope of such military drills.

Putin’s nuclear threats are pushing Europe to make peace with China

Finally, Moscow and Beijing have successfully expanded a number of regional organisations and forums to discuss joint economic, security and defence issues without the West’s involvement.

Given the critical uncertainties and unpredictable course of Russia’s war against Ukraine, its political, economic and financial survival amid isolation by the West will depend on China.

The extent to which this bilateral relationship influences global affairs will depend on China’s ability to sustain its economic growth, buffer Russia against sanctions, and avert the scenario of Russia’s economic and political collapse.