「中英」对抗时代的中美首脑峰会：拜登与习近平会面能否稳定局势 -

拜登总统周五在埃及。 Doug Mills/The New York Times

Just weeks after President Biden and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, laid out competing visions of how the United States and China are vying for military, technological and political pre-eminence, their first face-to-face meeting as top leaders will test whether they can halt a downward spiral that has taken relations to the lowest level since President Nixon began the opening to Beijing half a century ago.

就在拜登总统和中国领导人习近平就美中争夺军事、技术和政治方面领先地位提出了相互竞争的愿景几周之后，他们作为最高领导人的首次面对面会谈将检验他们能否阻止两国关系的螺旋式下降——它已经达到自尼克松总统半个世纪前开始向北京开放以来的最低水平。

Their scheduled meeting Monday in Indonesia will take place months after China brandished its military potential to choke off Taiwan, and the United States imposed a series of export controls devised to hobble China’s ability to produce the most advanced computer chips — necessary for its newest military equipment and crucial to competing in sectors like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

双方定于周一在印度尼西亚会面 ，就在几个月前，中国展示了其扼制台湾的军事实力，美国则实施了一系列旨在阻碍中国生产最先进计算机芯片的出口管控措施，这样的芯片是中国最新军事装备所必不可少的，而且对于双方在人工智能和量子计算等领域的竞争也至关重要。

Compounding the tension is Beijing’s partnership with Moscow, which has remained steadfast even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet that relationship, denounced by the Biden administration , is so opaque that U.S. officials disagree on its true nature.

使紧张局势更加复杂的是北京与莫斯科的伙伴关系，即使在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后，这种关系仍然坚定不移。然而，受到拜登政府 谴责的该关系非常不透明，以至于美国官员对其真实性质存在不同意见。

Whether it’s a partnership of convenience or a robust alliance, Beijing and Moscow share a growing interest in frustrating the American agenda, many in Washington believe. In turn, many in China see the combination of the U.S. export controls and NATO support for Ukraine as a foreshadowing of how Washington could try to contain China, and stymie its claims to Taiwan, a self-ruled island.

华盛顿的许多人认为，无论是权宜的伙伴关系还是强大的联盟关系，北京和莫斯科在挫败美国议程方面有着越来越大的共同利益。反过来，中国许多人 认为，美国的出口管制和北约对乌克兰的支持预示着华盛顿可能会试图遏制中国，并阻挠中国对自治岛屿台湾的主权主张。

习近平和普京 9 月在乌兹别克斯坦撒马尔罕举行的上海合作组织峰会上。 Sergei Bobylyov/Sputnik, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“This is in a sense the first superpower summit of the Cold War Version 2.0,” said Evan S. Medeiros , a Georgetown University professor who was President Obama’s top adviser on Asia-Pacific affairs. “Will both leaders discuss, even implicitly, the terms of coexistence amid competition? Or, by default, will they let loose the dogs of unconstrained rivalry?”

“从某种意义上说，这是冷战 2.0 版的第一次超级大国峰会，” 乔治城大学教授、奥巴马总统的亚太事务高级顾问埃文 · 梅代罗斯 说。“两位领导人是否会讨论——即便是比较含蓄地讨论——竞争中共存的条件？或者，在默认情况下，他们会放任不受约束的竞争吗？”

Tamping down expectations about the summit with Mr. Xi, American officials recently told reporters that they expected no joint statement on points of agreement to emerge. Still, Washington will dissect what Mr. Xi says publicly and privately, especially about Russia, Ukraine and Taiwan.

美国官员不久前告诉记者，他们预计不会出现关于会谈要点的联合声明，这降低了人们对此次峰会的期望。尽管如此，华盛顿仍将仔细分析习近平公开和私下所说的话，特别是关于俄罗斯、乌克兰和台湾问题的表述。

This month, Mr. Xi told the visiting German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, that China opposes “the threat or use of nuclear weapons,” an oblique but unusually public reproach to the Russian president Vladimir V. Putin’s saber rattling with tactical nuclear weapons.

本月，习近平对来访的德国总理肖尔茨说，中国反对 “使用或威胁使用核武器”，这是对俄罗斯总统普京用战术核武器进行威胁的指责，虽然含蓄但异常公开。

If Mr. Xi cannot say something similar with an American president next to him, one senior administration official noted, it will be telling. China sees Russia as a vital counterweight to Western power, and Mr. Xi may hesitate to criticize Mr. Putin in front of Mr. Biden.

一位高级政府官员指出，如果习近平在美国总统面前不能说出类似的话，那就说明了问题。中国将俄罗斯视为西方力量的重要制衡力量，习近平在拜登面前批评普京时可能会有所犹豫。

“If Putin used nuclear weapons, he would become the public enemy of humankind, opposed by all countries, including China,” said Hu Wei, a foreign policy scholar in Shanghai. But, he added, “If Putin falls, the United States and the West will then focus on strategic containment of China.”

“如果普京使用核武器，那就成为人类的公敌，会遭到所有国家的反对，包括中国，” 上海外交政策学者胡伟说。但他还说，“如果普京倒了，美国和西方就会锁定中国进行战略遏制。”

星期五，一名乌克兰士兵在乌克兰赫尔松地区的一个前俄罗斯基地。中国拒绝斥责俄罗斯的入侵行为，但习近平间接地批评了普京的核威胁。 Lynsey Addario for The New York Times

For American officials, the Xi-Putin relationship is a topic of internal debate. Colin Kahl, the No. 3 official in the Pentagon, told reporters Tuesday that Chinese leaders have “been much more willing to signal that this thing is edging toward an alliance as opposed to just a superficial partnership.” Mr. Biden seems doubtful. “I don’t think there’s a lot of respect that China has for Russia or for Putin,” he said the next day.

对于美国官员来说，习近平与普京的关系是一个内部讨论的话题。五角大楼的三号官员科林 · 卡尔周二对记者表示，中国领导人 “更愿意发出信号，表明双方正逐渐走向联盟，而不仅仅是表面上的伙伴关系”。拜登似乎对此表示怀疑。“我不认为中国对俄罗斯或普京有多少尊重，” 他在第二天说。

Mr. Xi and Mr. Biden have talked on the phone five times in the past 18 months. This will be different: For the first time since assuming the presidency, Mr. Biden will “sit in the same room with Xi Jinping, be direct and straightforward with him as he always is, and expect the same in return from Xi,” Jake Sullivan, the National Security Adviser, said at a White House briefing Thursday .

在过去 18 个月中，习近平和拜登已经通过五次电话。这次将有所不同。国家安全顾问沙利文在周四的白宫发布会上说 ，这是拜登先生就任总统以来第一次 “与习近平坐在同一个房间里，像以往一样对他直接了当，并期望习近平给予同样的回报”。

“There just is no substitute for this kind of leader-to-leader communication in navigating and managing such a consequential relationship,” Mr. Sullivan said.

“在引导和管理如此重要的关系方面，领导人之间的这种沟通是无可替代的，” 沙利文说。

During the past three decades, trips by American presidents to Beijing and Chinese presidents to Washington became relatively commonplace. Testy exchanges over disputes were often balanced by promises to cooperate on areas of mutual interest, whether climate change or containing North Korea’s nuclear program. For now, it is hard to imagine a meeting taking place in either capital, especially with China still under heavy Covid controls.

在过去 30 年里，美国总统访问北京和中国国家主席访问华盛顿变得相对平常。双方在争端问题上的激烈交锋，往往被承诺在共同关心的领域进行合作所平衡，无论是气候变化还是遏制朝鲜的核计划方面。目前，很难想象在这两个国家的首都举行会谈，尤其是中国仍在严格控制新冠疫情的情况下。

Summits on neutral ground, like this one in Bali ahead of the Group of 20 meeting of leaders, have an increasingly Cold War feel: more about managing potential conflict than finding common ground. The rancorous distrust means that even short-term stabilization and cooperation on shared challenges, like stopping pandemics, could be fragile.

在中立地点举行的峰会——比如 20 国集团领导人会议之前在巴厘岛举行的这次峰会——越来越有冷战的感觉：更多的是管理潜在冲突，而不是寻找共同点。这种强烈的不信任意味着，即使是短期的稳定和应对共同挑战方面的合作（比如抗击大流行）也可能是脆弱的 。

9 月，中国南通一家工厂的线路板生产线。美国对向中国出售半导体技术的新限制可能会减缓其技术进步。 Visual China Group, via Getty Images

Neither side calls it a Cold War, a term evoking a world divided between Western and Soviet camps bristling with nuclear arsenals. And the differences are real between that era and this one, with its vast trade flows and technological commerce between China and Western powers.

双方都不称其为冷战，这个词让人联想起世界分裂为西方阵营和苏联阵营进行核军备竞赛的时代。那个时代和这个时代的区别是巨大的，中国和西方大国之间有着大量的贸易往来和技术贸易。

The Apple iPhone and many other staples of American life are assembled almost entirely in China. Instead of trying to build a formal bloc of allies as the Soviets did, Beijing has sought to influence nations through major projects that create dependency, including wiring them with Chinese-made communications networks.

苹果手机和其他许多美国生活必需品几乎全部在中国组装。北京没有像苏联那样试图建立一个正式的盟友集团，而是寻求通过建立依赖性的重大项目来影响各国，包括为它们配备中国制造的通信网络。

Even so, the declarations surrounding Mr. Xi’s appointment to a third term and Mr. Biden’s new national security, defense and nuclear strategies have described an era of growing global uncertainty heightened by competition — economic, military, technological, political — between their countries.

即便如此，围绕着习近平获得第三个国家主席任期，以及拜登新的国家安全、国防及核战略的声明，描绘了一个全球不确定性日益增加的时代，这些不确定性又因两国在经济、军事、技术、政治领域的竞争而加剧。

The anxieties have been magnified by China’s plans to expand and modernize its still relatively limited nuclear arsenal to one that could reach at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, according to the Pentagon . China sees threats in American-led security initiatives, including proposals to help build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia .

“It may not be the Cold War, with a capital C and capital W, as in a replay of the U.S.-Soviet experience,” Professor Medeiros said. But, he added, “because of China’s substantial capabilities and its global reach, this cold war will be more challenging in many ways than the previous one.”

梅代罗斯说：“这跟当年的冷战还不一样，并非美苏经历的重演。” 但他表示，“由于中国强大的实力和全球影响力，今天的这场冷战在许多方面将比前一场更具挑战性。”

8 月，中国军用直升机在海峡对岸的福建海岸附近进行军事演习。 Hector Retamal/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The Biden administration last month issued extensive new restrictions on selling semiconductor technology to China, focusing on the multimillion-dollar machines needed to make the chips with the smallest circuitry and the fastest speeds. It was a clear effort to slow China’s progress in one of the few technological areas where it is still playing catch-up.

拜登政府上个月对向中国出售半导体技术发布了广泛的新限制 措施 ，重点是制造电路最小、速度最快的芯片所需的价值数以百万美元计的机器。这显然是为了减缓中国在少数仍处于追赶阶段的科技领域之一的进展。

In a 48-page National Security Strategy document, Mr. Biden wrote that China “is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.” The U.S. National Defense Strategy paper, weeks later , declared that China “remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades.”

在 48 页的《国家安全战略 》文件中，拜登宣告 ，中国 “是唯一一个既有重塑国际秩序的意图，又日益拥有推动这一目标的经济、外交、军事和技术实力的国家”。几周后 ，美国国防战略报告宣布，中国 “仍是我们未来几十年最重要的战略竞争对手”。

The stakes rose for the relationship after Mr. Xi, 69, secured a third five-year term as Communist Party leader in October, and set in place a resolutely loyal leadership lineup likely to keep him in power even longer than that. At the party congress that crowned Mr. Xi, he warned of an increasingly perilous world, where unnamed foes — implicitly, the United States and allies — were trying to “blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China.”

今年 69 岁的习近平在 10 月获得了作为共产党领导人的第三个五年任期，并建立了一个坚定忠诚的领导阵容，有可能使他的在位时间变得更长久。在为习近平加冕的党代会上，他发出警告，称这个世界越来越危险，没有指名道姓的敌人——暗指美国及其盟国——正试图对中国 “讹诈、遏制、封锁，极限施压”。

Since then, Mr. Xi and his officials have repeated similar warnings. Wearing camouflage to visit a People’s Liberation Army command center, Mr. Xi told China’s military to steel for the intensifying challenges. “Hostile forces” were bent on blocking China’s rise, Ding Xuexiang, a top aide to Mr. Xi, wrote in People’s Daily , the party’s main newspaper.

从那以后，习近平和他的官员一再发出类似的警告。习近平身着迷彩服视察中国人民解放军 的一个指挥中心，告诉中国军队要为日益严峻的挑战做好准备。习近平的高级幕僚丁薛祥在主要党报《人民日报》上写道 ，“敌对势力” 处心积虑阻滞中华民族伟大复兴的历史进程。

习近平最近视察了中国人民解放军的一个指挥中心，照片来自中国官方媒体。 Li Gang/Xinhua, via Associated Press

“The United States regards our country as its main strategic rival and most severe long-term challenge, and is doing its utmost to contain us and beat us down,” said an article in Guangming Daily , another prominent party-run newspaper.

共产党办的另一份著名报纸《光明日报 》上的一篇文章写道：“美国将我国视为最主要战略对手和最严峻的长期挑战，竭力对我进行遏制打压。”

Mr. Xi’s speech to the congress last month suggested that his assessment of international trends has grown bleaker. That shift may reflect worries about the repercussions of the war in Ukraine, and vanished hopes that Mr. Biden would take a milder approach to China than the Trump administration did.

习近平上个月在党代表大会上的讲话 表明，他对国际趋势的看法变得越来越悲观。这种转变可能反映了对乌克兰战争影响的担忧，以及对拜登采取比特朗普政府更温和的对华态度的希望破灭 。

The Biden administration’s support for Taiwan has become a sore point.

In early August, China launched menacing military drills around Taiwan after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island as a show of support. Mr. Biden has suggested that the United States would support Taiwan militarily if China attempted to take it by force, firmer wording than Washington’s formal position. Each time he has talked about direct involvement in Taiwan’s defense, his aides have rushed to assure that policy has not changed, while not disputing Mr. Biden has made it less ambiguous.

8 月初，在众议院议长佩洛西访问台湾以示支持后，中国在其周边发起了威胁性的军事演习 。拜登表示，如果中国试图以武力夺取台湾，美国将在军事上支持它 ，措辞比华盛顿的正式立场更坚定。每次他谈到直接参与台湾的国防事务时，他的助手都急于保证政策没有改变，但也不否认拜登降低了战略的模糊性。

“The difference between Biden and Trump is that Trump wanted to fight China single-handed,” said Mr. Hu, the foreign policy scholar. By contrast, he said, Mr. Biden “has attached particular importance to alliances in strategic competition with China.”

“拜登跟特朗普不一样的地方就在于，特朗普跟中国是单打独斗，” 外交政策学者胡伟说。相比之下，他说，拜登 “特别重视与中国战略竞争当中联盟的重要性”。

Mr. Sullivan, the national security adviser, indicated that the Biden administration would brief Taiwan on the results of the Xi meeting.

国家安全顾问沙利文表示，拜登政府将向台湾通报与习近平会面的结果。

上个月，事实上的台湾驻华盛顿大使在家中庆祝台湾国庆。 Valerie Plesch for The New York Times

Despite their differences, Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi want to avoid pent-up tensions exploding into a crisis that could wreak economic havoc.

尽管存在分歧，但拜登和习近平都不希望遭到压抑的紧张局势爆发为可能造成经济破坏的危机。

Mr. Biden said that he and Mr. Xi may discuss “what he believes to be in the critical national interests of China, what I know to be the critical interests of the United States, and to determine whether or not they conflict with one another. And if they do, how to resolve it and how to work it out.”

拜登说，他和习近平可能会讨论 “习近平眼中符合中国的关键国家利益，我所知道的美国的关键利益，并判定它们是否相互冲突。如果相互冲突，如何想办法来解决”。

Ahead of the meeting, Mr. Xi has also put on a somewhat friendlier demeanor.

在会晤之前，习近平也表现出了一定程度上的友好态度。

He told the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations that he wants to “find the right way to get along.” Zhao Lijian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, repeated that point at a regular briefing on Friday , and said Beijing would defend its “sovereignty, security and development interests,” while adding that “the U.S. and China should move toward each other, managing and controlling disagreements in a proper way and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation.”

他告诉 美中关系全国委员会，他希望 “找到正确的相处方式”。中国外交部发言人赵立坚周五在例行的新闻发布会 上重申了这一点，并表示北京将捍卫其 “主权、安全和发展利益”，同时补充说，“美方应同中方相向而行，妥善管控分歧，推进互利合作。”

Mr. Xi wants to put China’s growth back on track after heavy blows from Covid restrictions and problems in the housing market. He also wants to prevent tighter rules on purchases of high-end technology, which could spook investors and slow his plans for upgrading the economy.

在受到新冠防疫措施和房地产市场问题的沉重打击后，习近平希望中国的经济增长重回正轨。他还希望在购买高端技术上避免被实施更严格的规定，这可能会吓坏投资者，并减缓他的经济升级计划。

Mr. Xi is “preparing for a spectrum of tensions and conflict, but China is not going to fix all the vulnerabilities in its system — in the financial sector, exposure to the U.S. dollar system, exposure to tech dependencies — in just a few years,” said Andrew Small, author of “No Limits : The Inside Story of China’s War With the West.”

习近平 “正在为一系列紧张局势和冲突做准备，但中国不会在短短几年内修复其体系中的所有缺陷——金融部门、美元体系的敞口、技术依赖的敞口”，《无极限 ：中国与西方战争的内幕》(No Limits: The Inside Story of China’s War With the West)一书的作者司马安洲 (Andrew Small) 说。

He added, “They want to prevent this from sliding too far and too fast, and this may be a moment to explore whether they can stabilize things.”

他还说，“他们想防止这种情况走得太快太远，这次会谈可能是探索他们能否稳定局势的一个时刻。”