肖尔茨访华在即，德国能从俄罗斯问题中吸取教训吗？ - 纽约时报中文网

BERLIN — Germany understood the trap of strategic vulnerability that it had laid for itself in relying so heavily on Russian gas only after Moscow invaded Ukraine and turned off the spigot. But whether that lesson has been fully absorbed may be tested elsewhere: China.

柏林——当莫斯科入侵乌克兰并关上了天然气阀门时，德国才明白严重依赖俄罗斯天然气给自己埋下的战略漏洞陷阱。但德国是否吸取了这个教训，也许可以在另一个地方得到检验：中国。

As Chancellor Olaf Scholz prepares for his first visit to Beijing on Thursday, a planeload of executives in tow, Germany’s intelligence chiefs and allies are warning him against pursuing business as usual with a China that is saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait. Were tensions to escalate, Europe’s most powerful democracy could be exposed to economic coercion.

总理奥拉夫·肖尔茨正在为周四首次访问北京做准备，而德国情报部门的负责人和盟国警告他，由于中国对台湾海峡的武力威胁，不要像往常一样与中国做生意。如果紧张局势升级，欧洲最强大的民主国家可能会受到经济胁迫。

And Germany’s dependence on China is more complex than that on Russia: In addition to China’s export market, German industry also relies on China for raw materials and technologies critical for the transition to a carbon-neutral economy. From solar modules to batteries for electric cars, China is crucial.

而德国对中国的依赖比对俄罗斯的依赖更为复杂：除了中国的出口市场外，德国工业还依赖中国提供对向碳中和经济转型至关重要的原材料和技术。从太阳能组件到电动汽车电池，中国至关重要。

“When people talk about China, they say, ‘Russia is the storm, China is climate change,’” said Thomas Haldenwang, the president of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency. “We cannot allow a situation where the Chinese state can influence political events in Germany, possibly through critical infrastructure.”

“当人们谈论中国时，他们会说，‘俄罗斯是风暴，中国是气候变化，’”德国国内情报机构总裁托马斯·哈尔登旺说。“中国政府有可能通过关键基础设施影响德国的政治事件，我们不能允许这种情况发生。”

Yet Germany is edging in that direction — and at a moment when President Xi Jinping has just secured a third term with greater emphasis on China’s security interests and threats from the West, warning of “dangerous storms” on the horizon.

但德国正朝着这个方向前进——而此时习近平主席刚刚获得第三个任期，更加强调中国的安全利益和来自西方的威胁，并警告称“惊涛骇浪 ”即将来临。

德国卢布明的北溪2号天然气管道。肖尔茨今年停止了该项目，该项目将连接德国与俄罗斯，提供源源不断的天然气。 Lena Mucha for The New York Times

Even so, ahead of his trip, Mr. Scholz has been quietly engineering a compromise to allow Cosco, a Chinese state-owned shipping company, to buy a stake of up to 25 percent in a container-handling terminal in Hamburg port, Germany’s most important.

即便如此，在此行之前，肖尔茨一直在悄悄地设计一个妥协方案，允许中国国有航运公司中远集团购买汉堡港的一个集装箱装卸码头至多25%的股份，汉堡港是德国最重要的港口。

The investment, down from Cosco’s original proposal of 35 percent, was opposed by six of his ministries and both the domestic and foreign intelligence chiefs.

这项投资低于中远集团最初提出的35%股份，遭到了他的六个部门以及国内外情报部门负责人的反对。

They worry that Cosco’s stake could be weaponized by Beijing, whose state-owned companies already hold sway over other critical infrastructure and technology, including a stake in the Wilhelmshaven port and the mobile network of the German railway company, and in 2016 bought what was then Germany’s largest robotics firm, Kuka.

他们担心中远的股份可能被北京用作武器，中国的国有企业已经控制了其他关键基础设施和技术，包括在威廉港的股份和德国铁路公司的移动网络，并在2016年购买了当时的德国最大的机器人公司库卡。

As if to prove their point, German politicians say, Cosco threatened to take its business elsewhere if its bid was turned down. It is the Hamburg port’s biggest client, and already owns stakes in ports in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy . It also owns two-thirds of the port of Piraeus in Greece and even some stakes in ports in the United States.

为了证明观点，德国政界人士表示，中远扬言如果投标被拒绝，就会将其业务转移到别处。中远是汉堡港最大的客户，已经在荷兰、比利时、西班牙和意大利 的港口拥有股份。它还拥有希腊比雷埃夫斯港口三分之二的股份，甚至还拥有美国港口的部分股份。

“The blackmail is already in full swing,” said Norbert Röttgen, a conservative member of the German Parliament’s foreign affairs committee and outspoken China hawk. “It’s another building block of Chinese influence in Germany.”

“勒索已经全面展开，”德国议会外交事务委员会的保守派成员、公开的对华鹰派诺伯特·罗特根说。“这是中国在德国影响力的另一个部分。”

In a terse statement this week, Cosco cautioned that the Hamburg deal was still uncertain. “There is no assurance that the transaction will take place or when it may take place,” it said.

在本周的一份简短声明中，中远提醒称，汉堡的交易仍不确定。“无法保证交易会发生或何时发生，”它说。

德国汉堡，一艘中远集装箱船。 Axel Heimken/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Mr. Scholz, a former mayor of Hamburg whose successor is one of the noisiest advocates for the Cosco bid, has so far been silent on the matter.

肖尔茨曾是汉堡市长，他的继任者——中远集团竞标最聒噪的倡导者之一——迄今对此事保持沉默。

The bid has become a test case of the chancellor’s fledgling China strategy — and Germany’s willingness to pay an economic price for more strategic independence.

此次竞标已成为一个测试案例，考验德国总理刚刚起步的中国战略，以及德国愿为获得更多战略独立性而付出什么样的经济代价。

For decades, Germany’s postwar identity was that of a peaceful exporting nation, thriving on cheap Russian gas imports and ever-growing sales to its largest trading partner, China. That model made Germany the largest and most influential economy in Europe.

几十年来，德国的战后身份是一个和平的出口国，依靠廉价的俄罗斯天然气进口以及对其最大贸易伙伴中国不断增长的销售蓬勃发展。这种模式使德国成为欧洲最大、最具影响力的经济体。

Angela Merkel, Mr. Scholz’s predecessor, visited China a dozen times during her 16 years as chancellor, each time accompanied by dozens of executives. Exports to China helped lift Germany out of mass unemployment in the early years of her chancellorship, and cushioned the blow of the financial crisis years later. Unlike in the United States, where China’s economic rise led to industrial decline and job losses, in the export nation of Germany, it created growth.

肖尔茨的前任安格拉·默克尔在担任总理的16年中曾十几次访问中国，每次都由数十名高管陪同。在她担任总理的最初几年，对中国的出口帮助德国摆脱了大规模失业，并缓解了多年后金融危机的打击。在美国，中国经济崛起导致工业衰退和失业，在出口国德国则创造了增长。

Even before the war in Ukraine, Germany’s China policy was ripe for evolving from the mercantilist soft touch of the Merkel era. In 2019, the Federation of German Industries, or B.D.I., published a policy paper warning that the country’s liberal, open model was increasingly in competition with China’s “state-dominated economy” and that Germany should protect itself more forcefully from Chinese companies.

甚至在乌克兰战争之前，德国的对华政策就已经可以从默克尔时代的重商主义软性政策中蜕变出来。2019年，德国工业联合会发布了政策文件，警告该国的自由、开放模式与中国“国家主导的经济”的竞争日益激烈，德国应更加有力地保护自己免受中国公司的影响。

The war in Ukraine has only added urgency.

“The Russian attack on Ukraine has taught us that vis-à-vis autocratic states we have to be better prepared for extreme scenarios,” said Siegfried Russwurm, the president of the B.D.I., which represents more than 100,000 companies, with a combined payroll of over eight million people. “That is true for China, too.”

“俄罗斯对乌克兰的袭击告诉我们，面对独裁国家，我们必须为极端情况做更完善的准备，”德国工业联合会的总裁齐格弗里德·鲁斯沃姆说，该联合会代表超过10万家公司，共计超过800万人员工。“对中国来说也是如此。”

本月，乌克兰首都基辅的无人机袭击现场冒出浓烟。 乌战让德国改变其自由开放的经济模式有了更多紧迫性。 Brendan Hoffman for The New York Times

The widening imbalance between the economies has also sown alarm. In recent years, the Chinese government has pursued a series of industrial subsidy campaigns to wean itself from imports.

经济体之间不断扩大的不平衡也引发了恐慌。近年来，中国政府开展了一系列工业补贴运动，以摆脱对进口的依赖。

China now makes a very wide range of factory equipment that it used to buy from Germany. Covid lockdowns and a wave of nationalism have also hurt consumer spending on imports in China. At the same time, Germany has gone on buying ever more goods from there.

中国现在生产的各种工厂设备过去都是从德国购买。新冠疫情的封锁和一波民族主义浪潮也损害了中国消费者的进口支出。与此同时，德国继续从中国购买越来越多的商品。

The result is that Germany’s longtime trade surplus with China vanished late last year and has been replaced by a steadily widening deficit. Many German companies now see China as a competitor at home instead of an opportunity abroad.

结果德国对中国的长期贸易顺差在去年年底消失，取而代之的是不断扩大的逆差。许多德国企业如今将中国视为国内的竞争对手，而非海外的机遇。

“People always talk about how China is a big market — no, China is a huge economy with a small accessible market,” said Jörg Wuttke, the president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. Overall, E.U. exports to China are only slightly larger than those to Switzerland.

“人们总说中国是个巨大的市场——不，中国现在是一个可进入市场很小的巨大经济体，”中国欧盟商会主席伍德克(Joerg Wuttke)说。总体而言，欧盟对中国的出口仅略高于对瑞士。

All of that has added to the frustration with Mr. Scholz’s apparent tiptoeing around China, and not only from some German businesses.

所有这一切都让人们对肖尔茨在中国问题上明显的回避态度更加失望，这种失望情绪不仅仅来自一些德国企业。

President Emmanuel Macron of France had urged Mr. Scholz not to travel to Beijing on his own but as part of a joint delegation. The head of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency warned that the country was “painfully dependent” on China. Mr. Scholz’s own foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, of the Green Party, has struck a noticeably more hawkish tone on China, and especially on the Cosco bid.

法国总统马克龙曾敦促肖尔茨不要独自前往北京，而是加入一个联合代表团。德国外国情报机构负责人警告称该国“极其依赖”中国。肖尔茨自己的外交部长、绿党的安娜莱娜·贝尔伯克对中国的态度明显更加强硬，尤其是在中远竞购的问题上。

“The port of Hamburg is not just any port, but one of the key ports not only for us as an export nation, but for Europe as a whole,” she told The Süddeutsche Zeitung this month. “With every investment in German critical infrastructure, we have to ask ourselves what that could mean at the moment when China would oppose us as a democracy and a community of values.”

“汉堡港不仅是个港口，而是我们这个出口国家的关键港口之一，还是整个欧洲的关键港口之一，”她本月告诉《南德意志报》。“在对德国关键基础设施的每一次投资中，我们都必须问自己，当中国可能反对我们这个民主国家和价值观共同体的时候，这么做意味着什么。”

德国外交部长安娜莱娜·贝尔伯克对中国的态度明显强硬。“在对德国关键基础设施的每一次投资中，我们都必须问自己，当中国可能反对我们作为一个民主国家和一个价值观共同体的时候，这么做意味着什么，”她说。 Laetitia Vancon for The New York Times

Ms. Baerbock plans to lay out the country’s first China strategy early next year. It is expected to stress the need to diversify German economic interests away from China and toward other Asian partners, reflecting concerns in Germany’s intelligence and foreign-policy circles that China holds too much sway over the country’s most powerful companies.

贝尔伯克计划在明年年初制定德国首个对华战略。预计将会强调德国经济利益多元，从中国转向其他亚洲伙伴的必要性，反映出德国情报和外交政策圈担心中国对德国最强大的企业拥有过多的影响力。

Volkswagen, Daimler and BMW all sell more cars in China than anywhere else. Last month, the chemical giant BASF opened the first of several dozen factories that it is building in the 10 billion euro initial stage of a vast complex in southern China.

大众、戴姆勒和宝马在中国的汽车销量比其他任何地方都要多。上个月，作为中国南方一个价值100亿欧元的大型综合项目的初期工程，化工巨头巴斯夫正在建设的数十家工厂中的第一家已经开业。

Even as many smaller German businesses pare back their exposure to China, a narrowing group of corporate giants has continued to invest. Early this year, for instance, BMW paid €3.7 billion to increase its stake in a joint car-making venture in China.

尽管许多规模较小的德国企业削减了对中国的敞口，但少数集团巨头仍在继续投资。例如，在今年早些时候，宝马斥资37亿欧元增持了中国一家合资汽车制造企业的股份。

Persuading these companies to diversify away from China has proved a struggle. It has not helped that the government once gave them every incentive to do business there — often even guaranteeing their investments in the country, a tool some officials want to start restricting.

事实证明，说服这些企业将业务分散到中国以外的地方并非易事。政府曾给了他们在中国做生意的所有理由——甚至常常为他们在华投资提供担保，一些官员希望开始限制这种手段。

“We cannot be completely indifferent if the backbone of German industry is invested in the Chinese market, and is willing to take certain risks, in such a way that if they ever got into trouble, we suspect they would simply be ‘too big to fail,’” said Petra Sigmund, the Foreign Ministry’s director general on Asia policy, who is overseeing the writing of the China strategy.

“如果德国工业的支柱投资了中国市场，并愿意承担一定风险，我们不能完全坐视不理，因为如果它们遇到麻烦，我们怀疑就会出现‘大到不能倒’的局面，”负责制定对华战略的外交部亚洲政策司长司佩兰(Petra Sigmund)说。

Martin Brudermüller, the chief executive of BASF who will be traveling to Beijing with Mr. Scholz, stressed this week how important China was for the German economy and lamented what he called “the China bashing.”

本周将与肖尔茨一同前往北京的巴斯夫总裁薄睦乐(Martin Brudermüller)强调了中国对德国经济的重要性，并对他所谓的“抹黑中国”表示遗憾。

Some see a dangerous clash of national and corporate interest reminiscent of the debates over Russian gas pipelines. BASF was one of the companies that had to write off its investment into the Russian pipeline Nord Stream 2.

一些人认为，这是国家利益和企业利益的危险冲突，类似于俄罗斯天然气管道争议。巴斯夫正是不得不放弃对俄罗斯“北溪2号”管线投资的企业之一。

5月在中国成都的捷达装配线。 VCG via Getty Images

“There’s a serious risk of our national security interests, and the interest of the national economy as a whole, diverging from the specific of the special interests of some of the major companies which are heavily invested in China — that’s a fact,” said Nils Schmid, the foreign policy spokesman for Mr. Scholz’s Social Democrats in Parliament.

“我们的国家安全利益和整个国民经济的利益，有可能与一些在中国大量投资的大企业的特殊利益相背离——这一严重风险是事实，”肖尔茨所在社会民主党的议会外交政策发言人尼尔斯·施密德表示。

Mr. Scholz’s reluctance to take a tougher line on China, observers say, is likely to be a reflection of uneasiness over the German economy. The chancellor is treading carefully to avoid creating a sense of confrontation with China when the country is headed for recession and Europe is already locked in a standoff with Russia.

观察人士称，肖尔茨不愿对中国采取更强硬的立场，可能反映了对德国经济的不安。在德国经济走向衰退、欧洲已与俄罗斯陷入僵局之际，这位总理正在谨慎行事，以避免制造与中国对抗的感觉。

“We are in a precarious economic situation due to the war,” said Thorsten Benner, the director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin. “Part of the hesitation is that Scholz doesn’t want to send shock waves into the system.”

“因为战争，我们的经济状况并不稳定，”位于柏林的全球公共政策研究所所长托尔斯滕·贝纳表示。“举棋不定的部分原因在于，朔尔茨不想给经济体系带来冲击。”

But he and others said Germany’s economic anxieties should not factor into decisions on strategic investments, such as Cosco’s bid in the Hamburg port, out of fear that Chinese business would go elsewhere. European states need to stand together, they say, and Germany cannot be afraid to be the first.

但他和其他专家都表示，德国不能因为担心中国企业会转移到其他地方，就让经济焦虑影响战略投资决策，例如中远对汉堡港的竞标。他们说，欧洲国家需要站在一起，德国不能害怕成为出头鸟。

“There is no country that has to change more than Germany,” said Mr. Röttgen, the conservative lawmaker. “We can’t go on like this. We need a growth model without geopolitical dependencies.”

“没有哪个国家比德国更需要改变了，”保守派议员洛特根说。“我们不能再这样下去了。我们需要拿出摆脱地缘政治依赖的增长模式。”

“It’s hard,” Mr. Röttgen added. “But the lesson from Russia is that if we don’t change we will pay a much higher price for it later.”

“这很难实现，”洛特根还表示。“但俄罗斯给我们的教训是，如果不改变自身，我们以后将为此付出更大的代价。”
https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20221031/germany-russia-china/dual/