• China and Bhutan aim to resolve a long-running border dispute | China
• Jewher Ilham on how policymakers can stand up to the Chinese government’s mistreatment of Uyghurs | By Invitation
• Japan PM Kishida: cooperating with Philippines, US to protect South China Sea
• [Business] China and Australia: Frenemies who need each other
• A new chapter: how China sees Albanese’s ‘ice-breaking’ state visit

China and Bhutan aim to resolve a long-running border dispute | China

https://www.economist.com/china/2023/11/02/china-and-bhutan-aim-to-resolve-a-long-running-border-dispute

Chinese diplomats have had a rough ride in South Asia for most of the past four years. Relations with India took a nosedive after a deadly border clash in 2020. Debt problems, political instability and militant attacks on Chinese nationals have strained an “ironclad” friendship with Pakistan. Mass unrest toppled a China-friendly president in Sri Lanka last year after it plunged into a debt crisis linked to Chinese lending. Bangladesh also shelved several infrastructure projects tied to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The rapprochement is geopolitically important for several reasons. Bhutan does not have formal diplomatic ties with any of the five permanent members (or P5) of the UN Security Council—America, Britain, China, France and Russia—largely owing to its history of isolationism and non-alignment in the cold war. Opening formal ties with China could lead Bhutan to do the same with other P5 members, drawing it into the ongoing tussle for diplomatic influence around China’s borders.

But it is most significant for India. Under a treaty signed in 1949, India gained a formal right to guide Bhutan’s foreign policy in exchange for free trade and security guarantees. The foreign-policy provision was scrapped in 2007, but India has remained Bhutan’s most important diplomatic and economic partner.

Indian officials’ chief concern is Doklam because it is near the Siliguri corridor (also known as “the chicken’s neck”) which connects India’s north-eastern states to the rest of the country. Indian authorities have long feared that China, which won a brief border war with India over a nearby part of the disputed frontier in 1962, might try to sever the Siliguri corridor.

India may now have accepted that diplomatic ties between China and Bhutan are inevitable, given the lure of Chinese trade and investment. But it wants a role in the border talks and is sceptical about a land swap. Progress might still be possible, given that China and India both seem keen to stabilise their border dispute. Since the deadly clash in 2020, they have pulled back troops from several flashpoints, creating buffer zones where neither side patrols.

But Indian officials also have concerns about China’s renewed efforts to enhance its clout in a region that India considers its backyard. Several South Asian states are indebted to China. The Maldives, where India had recently reasserted its influence, elected a new pro-China president, Mohamed Muizzu, in September. He has since asked India to remove the roughly 70 Indian troops stationed there to maintain radar stations and other military assets.

In Sri Lanka, too, India has pushed back against China’s influence in recent years, but the island nation has lately indicated that it seeks strong relations with both of Asia’s giants. On October 25th Sri Lanka’s government allowed a Chinese scientific-research vessel to dock in Colombo, its biggest city, despite American and Indian security concerns. Sri Lanka’s president, Ranil Wickremesinghe, also attended the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in October. The geopolitical jockeying is sure to continue. But China is still very much in the game. ■

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Jewher Ilham on how policymakers can stand up to the Chinese government’s mistreatment of Uyghurs | By Invitation

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/11/02/jewher-ilham-on-how-policymakers-can-stand-up-to-the-chinese-governments-mistreatment-of-uyghurs

JUST WEEKS after the ninth anniversary of my father receiving a life sentence, I married the love of my life. We held our wedding ceremony at the local mosque, knowing that my father, Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur scholar, could not be by my side. He has not even met my new husband.

I look to my father for guidance every day, even though it has been years since we were last permitted to speak. I feel his presence as I carry the torch of his advocacy for marginalised people in China and around the world. In my homeland, the Uyghur Region (which the Chinese government calls Xinjiang), Uyghurs like me and other Turkic and Muslim-majority peoples are being subjected to an ethnic-cleansing campaign that includes mass detention, abuse and systematic state-sponsored forced labour.

My father dedicated his life to speaking up for justice, advocating for a world in which all people can express their beliefs, be free to follow the traditions of their own culture and be respected as equals. He was arrested by the Chinese government in January 2014 on charges of inciting separatism. Eight months later, without a fair trial, he was sentenced to life in prison and put in solitary confinement. All for standing against the very oppression that Uyghurs are experiencing today.

In September I heard that Rahile Dawut, a renowned Uyghur anthropologist, had also been sentenced to life in prison. I am deeply saddened that her daughter, Akida Pulat, had to find out about her mother’s sentencing on the news, just as I did over nine years ago. The kind of draconian treatment that my father received is still being meted out to intellectuals or anyone who thinks differently, behaves differently or has a different culture and ethnic identity from the Han Chinese.

My hope is that governments will take action to address the human-rights crisis facing the Uyghur people. There have been some positive signs: in 2021 President Joe Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act (UFLPA), which prohibits goods made in whole or in part in the Uyghur Region from entering America. The UFLPA is the strongest piece of legislation globally to address corporate complicity in Uyghur forced labour. Since the law’s enforcement began, more than 5,000 shipments, with a value of $1.8bn, have been detained. More than half of these have been denied entry to America.

Since the UFLPA came into force, China has grown much less cotton in the Uyghur Region. China is the world’s biggest grower and the key processor of the crop—accounting for over 20% of global production by volume—but its output looks set to fall by more than 10% this year. The Uyghur Region’s share of the global market for polysilicon, a key component in solar panels, has also fallen, from 45% to 35% in just a couple of years.

However, this law is not enough. Companies need to ensure that no part of their supply chain is linked directly or indirectly to Uyghur forced labour. Governments should address gaps in corporate accountability by adopting legally binding measures that require human-rights due diligence to identify, prevent and remedy abuses in their supply chains and hold companies legally accountable for complicity. Governments should also impose sanctions on individuals and entities that are responsible for, or benefit from, forced labour. They should adopt laws similar to the UFLPA to ensure their markets are not dumping grounds for goods forcibly made by Uyghurs. No Uyghur in the diaspora should be left wondering like me: did my imprisoned father or cousin or uncle make this shirt?

In the years since my father’s arrest, I have visited prisons and read, watched and listened to whatever I could to try to understand the experience of those locked up. I wonder: what is my father doing in one of those dark cells? Does he have enough to eat? Is there even a toilet in his cell? Is he allowed to read? Is he forced to work day and night making garments or packaging red dates? And the question that scares me the most: is he even alive? I still don’t have any answers. The Chinese government has denied my father family visits since 2017.

Despite the positive impact of the UFLPA, many Uyghurs are still suffering, their freedoms restricted. The Chinese government falsely labels its campaign against them, including forced relocation and mass internment, as “poverty alleviation” and an effort to stamp out “separatism, terrorism and extremism”. For my father, as an economist, teacher and author, poverty alleviation was an academic bedrock. He believes that economic growth requires equal access to decent education and jobs, and that growth must not come at the expense of freedom—of culture, worship or expression.

His main point was simple: if the Chinese government would follow its own laws, which guarantee extensive autonomy to regions where the majority of the population was historically not Han Chinese, the Uyghurs would have the opportunity to share in growth—to the ultimate benefit of the entire country. Unfortunately, the Chinese government is not abiding by its own laws. Instead, it decided my father’s work was a threat to the regime. Dr Dawut’s life sentence in September for “endangering state security” is a reminder that although the plight of Uyghurs may have faded from headlines, China’s oppression of my people continues unrelentingly.

What will it take for governments, corporations, investors and individuals to decide that our suffering has gone on long enough, and that the wrongful imprisonment must end? As the daughter of Ilham Tohti, I live in fear at all times. I fear that many more innocent Uyghurs will, like my father, be left forgotten in dark cells. I fear that one day no one will remember Ilham Tohti. ■

Jewher Ilham is the Forced Labour Project Co-ordinator at the Worker Rights Consortium and a spokesperson for the Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region.

Japan PM Kishida: cooperating with Philippines, US to protect South China Sea

https://reuters.com/article/philippines-japan-southchinasea/japan-pm-kishida-cooperating-with-philippines-us-to-protect-south-china-sea-idUSKBN31Z01L

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said on Saturday his country, the Philippines and the United States were cooperating to protect the freedom of the South China Sea as he committed to help enhance Manila's security capabilities.

"In the South China Sea, trilateral cooperation to protect the freedom of the sea is under way," Kishida, on an official visit, said in an address before the Philippine congress in the capital Manila.

Kishida and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr agreed on Friday to start negotiations on a reciprocal troop access deal to strengthen military cooperation as China becomes increasingly assertive in the region.

The Philippines and Japan, two of the United States' closest Asian allies, have taken a strong line against what they see as aggressive behaviour by Chinese vessels amid decades-old disputes over maritime sovereignty.

China claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, including parts of the exclusive economic zones of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 said China's claims had no legal basis.

"Japan will continue to contribute to the enhancement of the Philippines' security capabilities, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability," Kishida said.

Japan in March observed U.S.-Philippine military drills, and in June the Philippine and Japanese coast guards trained together for the first time.

"Through these efforts, let us protect the maritime order, which is governed by laws and rules, not by force," said Kishida, who in December unveiled Japan's biggest military build-up as it looks to counter China's growing military might.

Japan does not have any claim to the South China Sea, but has a maritime dispute with China in the East China Sea.

Kishida said Japan agreed to provide the Philippines coastal surveillance radars, the first cooperation project in the world under its Official Security Assistance programme, aimed at helping boost deterrence capabilities of Tokyo's partner countries.

"Japan intends to further deepen strategic cooperation with the Philippines in the future," said Kishida, who is to make a stop at the Philippine Coast Guard on Saturday before leaving Manila.

Kishida said his country's relationship with the Philippines had reached a "golden age."

Last month China and the Philippines traded accusations over a collision in the disputed waters of the South China Sea as Chinese vessels blocked Philippine boats supplying forces there.

[Business] China and Australia: Frenemies who need each other

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67305453?at_medium=RSS&at_campaign=KARANGA

A new chapter: how China sees Albanese’s ‘ice-breaking’ state visit

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/04/a-new-chapter-how-china-sees-albaneses-ice-breaking-state-visit

It’s a busy time in Beijing – this autumn has already hosted a major Belt and Road forum, international dignitaries, and a security summit. But an upcoming visit by the Australian prime minister has also prompted a flurry of preparations and discussion.

Anthony Albanese’s three-day tour of Shanghai and Beijing, the first prime ministerial visit to the country in seven years, is being warmly welcomed. He is expected to meet with the premier, Li Qiang – the host of the official visit – and the president, Xi Jinping, with whom Canberra has said Albanese will raise tough issues.

Chinese state media reporting on the upcoming visit have characterised the trip as a new chapter of the turbulent Australia-China relationship, a thawing of a frost which had hardened over recent years. Many reports have lauded the return to higher trade. On Thursday, a lengthy interview in the People’s Daily with the former trade minister, Andrew Robb, was glowing about the economic relationship and hope for the future.

The official outlet China Daily described the trip as politically and economically “ice-breaking” after dialogue halted in 2016 “because of the previous Australian government’s adversarial stance toward China”.

Reports and Chinese officials who spoke to the Guardian cited Australia’s Huawei ban, early calls for a Covid-19 inquiry, and the 2020 Asio raid on Chinese state media reporters. Several said a key point of tension was Canberra’s strengthening of regional partnerships which appear targeted towards China – including Aukus, the Quad and strengthening ties with Japan – and its “interference” in the South China Sea.

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Beijing has characterised much of Australia’s actions as blindly following the US, China’s major rival. “For most of its history, Australia has been reluctant to exercise independence and to partner with the countries in its region,” said a China Daily editorial.

“I don’t think Australia should pick and choose between China and the United States,” said Victor Gao, chair professor at Soochow University, in a video op-ed published by the Global Times.

“Australia is not a competitor for China – militarily, politically speaking, economically speaking, in terms of trading relations.”

In Beijing, a senior analyst at a Chinese thinktank told the Guardian that Australia needed to think “more independently”.

Several concessions were made before the visit. Tariffs on wine and other Australian imports have been lifted in return for Australia easing restrictions on Chinese windtowers. The Australian journalist Cheng Lei was released from detention after almost three years on undefined national security charges, although it was officially explained as the conclusion of criminal justice processes.

Last month, a small group of Australian journalists, including this reporter, were invited to China. The tightly managed trip was the resumption of a decade-long exchange program between the Australia Pacific Journalism Centre and the Chinese Communist party-linked All-China Journalists Association. The program had paused because of the pandemic, but its resumption remained on ice amid the souring relations.

It was suggested the week-long trip was both a gesture of goodwill ahead of Albanese’s visit, and something of a test. No Australian media outlets have had correspondents in China since the ABC’s Bill Birtles and Michael Smith from the AFR fled in 2020 after being interrogated by security services.

Under the authoritarian rule of Xi, candid conversations with people inside China has become increasingly difficult and – if opinions are critical of the CCP – dangerous. Voices from outside the tour spoke of a chilling of critical conversation, and a suspicion that there was little if any critical information reaching Xi from fearful subordinates. One noted that leader-to-leader meetings like Albanese’s were increasingly crucial as the only way to guarantee Xi was receiving a complete message.

In discussion about the decline in relations, party officials, thinktankers, state media journalists and business people supported a common state media narrative that the blame lay entirely with the Morrison and Turnbull governments – nevermind that the Albanese government has largely stuck to the same foreign policy stance.

“Sensational” Australian media reporting about the threat of China was also noted, as was domestic concern about levels of foreign investment in Australia’s property market. Australian concern over China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang was rejected, but there was surprising acceptance of the reputational damage done by its crackdown in Hong Kong. Objections to Beijing’s threats to Taiwan were roundly dismissed as not the world’s business. Few would speak about the release of Cheng Lei, either declining or answering a completely different and unasked question. None would talk of Yang Hengjun, still in prison.

• Additional research by Chi Hui Lin